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CERTIFIED CHECKS AND FUNDS REDIRECTION
RICHARD A. LORDI
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PRACTICE OF CERTIFYING CHECKS began over 150years ago in England as a collection aid.1 When an instrument
was certified, or "marked," it was given preference for payment over
other checks of the drawer if presented 2 the following day. 3 Al-
though the certified check never became established in England, 4 in
the United States its function as a collection aid was expanded, and
by 1860 it was held to be an unconditional promise by the certifying
bank to pay on demand. 5 The certified check represented a promise
by the bank as well as by the drawer to pay the instrument and
therefore was viewed as highly reliable commercial paper.
6
The desirable stability created by this dual liability on the cer-
tified check has been duplicated today by other instruments, includ-
f Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. B.A., Alfred Uni-
versity, 1971; J.D., Memphis State University, 1975; LL.M., Yale University, 1976. The author
wishes to acknowledge the excellent research assistance provided by Sherry Mills Moore, a
third year law student at the University of North Dakota School of Law.
1. Robson v. Bennett, 2 Taunt. 388, 127 Eng. Rep. 1128 (C.P. 1810). See Steffen & Starr,
A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 13 N.C.L. REv'. 450 (1935).
2. Section 3-504(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 3-504(1), defines present-
ment as "a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the maker, acceptor, drawee or other
payor by or on behalf of the holder." Id.
3. Steffen & Starr, supra note 1, at 463.
4. See id. at 463-64.
5. Willets v. Phoenix Bank, 9 Super. (2 Duer) 121 (N.Y. City Super. Ct. 1853). See Steffen
& Starr, supra note 1, at 466.
6. See generally Steffen & Starr, supra note 1, at 466-72. Section 3-411 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, U.C.C. § 3-411, which continues the rule of the UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAw §§ 187-188, provides that when the holder procures certification of the
instrument "the drawer and all prior indorsers of the instrument are discharged." U.C.C. §
3-411(1). Where certification is procured by a drawer, however, the drawer and the drawee
remain liable. See id. § 3-411, Comment 1; H. BAILEY, THE LAXV OF BANK CHECKS § 7.6, at
156 (4th ed. 1969).
The drawer remains liable when either a third party or the drawer himself seeks certifi-
cation at the insistence of the holder or payee. Id. The benefit to subsequent takers is clear
under this rule since the drawer, the indorsers, and the certifying bank are all available in the
event of dishonor. Id. In the usual case where the drawer has the check certified and then
delivers it to the payee, the paper carries the dual obligation of the drawer and the certifying
bank. See id. See generally State Bank v. Mid-City Trust & Say. Bank, 295 Ill. 599, 603-04, 129
N.E.2d 498, 499-500 (1920) (acceptance or certification by drawee bank of check presented by a
forger was ineffective to change obligations of drawer and drawee bank); Randolph Nat'l Bank v.
Hornblower, 160 Mass. 401, 401-02, 35 N.E. 850, 850-51 (1894) (failure of drawee bank, whose
certification of a check was obtained by drawer, will not relieve drawer of its obligation to
payee); Anglo-South Am. Bank v. National City Bank, 161 A.D. 268, 275-77, 146 N.Y.S. 457,
462-63 (1914), aff'd iner., 217 N.Y. 726, 112 N.E. 1053 (1916) (where certification was pro-
cured by an unlawful holder and check was paid over a forged indorsement, certifying bank was
liable to drawer, but not to payee, who could still hold drawer liable on underlying contract).
(28)
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ing the cashier's check, 7 the bank draft, 8 and the money order. 9 The
availability of these equally marketable instruments 10 in combination
7. A cashier's check is an instrument "drawn by a bank upon itself, accepted in advance by
the act of issuance." Ross v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 264 F.2d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 1959). The
instrument represents a promise by the bank to pay a primary obligation of the bank. Id. Under
this interpretation, the bank occupies the position of both drawer and drawee. Id. Several
courts have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's analysis that a cashier's check is accepted by the
bank upon issuance. See Banco Canadero y Agricola, S.A. v. Society Nat'l Bank, 418 F. Supp.
520, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1976): Dziurak v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 88 Misc. 2d 641, 646-47,
388 N.Y.S.2d 496, 501-02 (Sup. Ct. 1976), rev'd, 58 A.D.2d 103, 105-06, 396 N.Y.S.2d 414,
415-16 (1977), aff'd mern., 44 N.Y.2d 776, 377 N.E.2d 474, 406 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1978). For com-
parisons of cashier's checks and certified checks, see Walker v. Sellers, 201 Ala. 189, 189, 77 So.
715, 715 (1918): Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Walker, 195 Ala. 552, 555, 70 So. 754, 756 (1916);
Wright v. Trust Co. of Ga., 108 Ca. App. 783, 787, 134 S.E.2d 457, 461-62 (1963); Foreman v.
Martin, 6 Ill. App. 3d 599, 602, 286 N.E.2d 80, 82 (1972); Beecher v. Morse, 286 Mich. 513,
516-17, 282 N.W. 226, 227-28 (1938): Perry v. West, 110 N.H. 351, 354, 266 A.2d 849, 852
(1970); H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 7.6, at 156. See also notes 10 & 12 infra.
8. A bank draft is a draft or check drawn by an issuing bank upon its correspondent bank,
and usually procured by a third party purchaser (remitter), See H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 1.6,
at 10. Although the liability of the bank which draws the draft is fixed by its issuance, the
liability of the bank on which the draft is drawn is determined by the bank's acceptance or
payment. Kohler v. First Nat'l Bank, 157 Wash. 417, 422-23, 289 P. 47, 49 (1930). While
ordinarily the liability of a bank draft will be singular rather than dual, since the correspondent
drawee is like any other drawee, the fact that both the drawer and the drawee are banks lends
great stability to the paper. For a discussion of bank drafts and cashier's checks, see Capital
Nat'l Bank v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 166 Miss. 376, 382, 148 So. 386, 386 (1933): In re
Bank of United States, 243 A.D. 287, 291, 277 N.Y.S. 96, 100 (1935); Anderton v. Shippee, 111
R.I. 2, 4 n.1, 298 A.2d 533, 534 n.1 (1973); H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 1.6 at 10. See note 10
infra.
9. A money order is a form of a tripartite credit instrument calling for the payment of
money to the named payee. Bailey, Bank Personal Money Orders as Bank Obligations, 81
BANKING L.J, 669, 670 (1964). The three parties are the payee, the drawee, and the remit-
ter. Id. A money order can be negotiable or nonnegotiable and may be issued by a governmental
agency, a bank, a private person, or any other entity authorized to issue it. People v. Norwood,
26 Cal. App. 3d 148, 155-56, 103 Cal. Rptr. 7, 12 (1972); Hong Kong Importers, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Express Co., 301 So. 2d 707, 709 (La. Ct. App. 1974). Money orders issued by a bank may
take one of two forms, either the so-called "bank money order" or the "personal money order."
H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 1.7, at 10-11. The primary distinction between these is that the
personal money order, which closely resembles an ordinary check, is not signed by the issuer-
bank, whereas the bank money order usually is signed. Id. at 11. Some courts do not view the
personal money order as the bank's obligation at the point of issuance, since it is not signed by
the bank. See Garden Check Cashing Serv. Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 25 A.D. 2d 137, 140-41,
267 N.Y.S.2d 698, 701-02, aff'd mem., 18 N.Y.2d 941, 223 N.E.2d 566, 277 N.Y.S.2d 141
(1966). There is authority, however, to the contrary. See generally H. BAILEY, supra note 6, §
7.1, at 12: Bailey, supra, at 672-78. The bank money order, as the equivalent of the cashier's
check, is clearly the issuing bank's obligation. See United States v. Milton, 382 F.2d 976, 978
(6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 952 (1968); First Nat'l Bank v. Farmers & Merchants
State Bank, 417 S.W.2d 317, 323 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967); H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 1.7, at 12.
Therefore, the bank money order cannot theoretically be countermanded by the purchaser. See
Bank of Niles v. American State Bank, 14 II1. App. 3d 729, 733, 303 N.E.2d 186, 188 (1973).
But see Trouard v. First Nat'l Bank, 247 So. 2d 607, 610-11 (La. Ct. App. 1971). Both types of
money orders give the holder security as "paid for" obligations, because they are purchased by
the remitter and are not subject to problems of insufficient funds like ordinary checks. See
Bailey, supra, at 671. Unlike the ordinary check and the certified check, the money order does
not require that the purchaser have an account at the bank. See id. at 670-71. Money orders
have thus been labelled "the poor man's checking account." Id. at 671.
10. See notes 7-9 supra. Although the instruments are equally marketable, they are not
necessarily equally secure. A certified check allows the payee to rely upon the credit of both the
bank and the drawer, whereas the bank money order gives recourse only against the issuer. See
U.C.C. § 3-411; H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 1.7, at 12; id., § 1.7, at 7 (Supp. 1975). The payee
2
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with the problems encountered when certified checks are processed
through an automated system has called into question the usefulness
of certified checks." Nevertheless, statutes enacted when certified
checks were more prominent instruments provide them with con-
tinued utility. 12 Such statutes typically allowed or required the cer-
tified check to be substituted for cash in specified situations. 1 3 Until
of a bank draft has recourse only against the drawer bank until the draft is accepted by the
drawee bank. See First Nat'l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. 706, 709, 244 P. 1039, 1040
(1926); H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 1.6, at 7 (Supp. 1975).The cashier's check provides recourse
only against one entity, the issuing bank. See State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins, 165 Ohio St.
185, 187-88, 134 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1956); H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 1.6, at 7 (Supp. 1975). A
cashier's check may generally be regarded as theoretically equivalent to a certified check in that
neither can be countermanded, both circulate in the commercial world as primary obligations of
the issuing bank, and both act as substitutes for the money represented. See id. at 6-8. The
bank, however, in its dual role as drawee and drawer of the cashier's check, is the sole obligor
for the amount of the check, as opposed to the certified check where both the drawee and the
drawer are liable on the instrument. Id. at 7. Of course, this distinction is meaningless to the
extent that the drawer-drawee bank is solvent. Unlike the certified check or cashier's check,
where the instrument is accepted by the bank upon certification or issuance, the drawee bank of
a bank draft is in the same position as with a check drawn by an individual. See Chetopa State
Bank v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 114 Kan. 463, 467, 218 P. 1000, 1002 (1923). Until
the instrument is accepted or paid by the drawee bank, the drawee owes no obligation or
payment to the payee. See U.C.C. § 3-409; First Nat'l Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 120 Kan. at
709, 244 P. at 1040. The stability of the bank draft exists, therefore, not in the nature of the
obligation on the instrument, but in the status of the drawer as a bank and not an individual.
See generally H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 1.6, at 10. Particularly in this day of few bank
insolvencies and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance, the bank generally is viewed
as a better credit risk than an individual.
The security of the bank money order derives mainly from the same source as the bank
draft-the secure nature of the issuer. See Bailey, supra note 9, at 671. The personal money
order, however, if viewed as substantially the equivalent of the ordinary check and not as the
bank's obligation, is secure only because it has been purchased and, unless countermanded, the
funds are available to pay the instrument. See note 9 supra.
11. See H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 7.1, at 149-50. See also Bowie County v. Farmers'
Guar. State Bank, 289 S.W. 451, 455 (Tex. Ct. App. 1926) (Hodges, J., dissenting). Where
checks are handled electronically, certification causes complications. See Windsor, The Certified
Check, A Special Handling Item in Automation, 81 BANKING L.J. 480 (1964); Freed, Some Legal
Implications of the Use of Computers in the Banking Business, 19 Bus. LAW. 355, 362 (1964). A
customer's account is generally charged when the check is certified, but the magnetic encoding
(micr) on the check itself is not changed to show that the amount has been deducted from the
account balance. Windsor, supra at 481. Since the electronic processor does not pick up this cer-
tification, the customer's account is recharged when the check is later presented fbr payment.
Id. For proposed changes and possible alternatives, see id. at 483-88; Freed, supra, at 362.
12. Some statutes provide that the only permissible substitute for cash when paying for
certain public services, such as bids on municipal contracts, is the certified check. See, e.g.,
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-1835(B) (1956) (bids for irrigation districts); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71,§ 1636 (Purdon 1962) (bids for public printing and binding). See generally Windsor, supra
note 11, at 486-87. If the statutes so specify, courts have indicated that no other instrument may
be substituted for the certified check. See Perry v. West, 110 N.H. 351, 353-54, 266 A.2d 849,
851-52 (1970); State ex rel. Babcock v. Perkins, 165 Ohio St. 185, 187-89, 134 N.E.2d 839, 842
(1956); Bowie County v. Farmers' Guar. State Bank, 289 S.W. 451, 452-53 (Tex. Ct. App. 1926).
But see Hornung v. Town of West N.Y., 82 N.J.L. 266, 267, 81 A. 1116, 1116 (Sup. Ct. 1911)
(indorsed cashier's check met requirement of certified check).
13. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 198 (1976) (payment for import duties and public dues); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.03 (Page 1956) (current version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3515.03
(Page 1972)) (current version allows usage of other substitutes for cash when applying for election
recount). See note 12 supra.
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new legislation changes these provisions, the certified check remains
both useful and necessary. Moreover, the litigation which occasionally
arises demonstrates that the certified check is not yet an extinct type
of commercial paper. 14 This article explores some of the troublesome
issues which surround certified checks and in particular addresses the
question of the drawer's ability to redirect the sum evidenced by the
instrument to someone other than the named payee.
II. THE INITIAL PROBLEM
Consider what must be a daily occurrence throughout the United
States: D, the drawer of a check made payable to payee (P), decides
instead to use the funds represented thereby to pay alternative payee
(AP). If the check has already been issued 15 to P, D can order the
drawee bank to stop payment 16 as long as the check has not yet been
presented to and acted upon by the drawee bank. 17 While D re-
mains liable to P on the underlying obligation for which the check
was issued, 18 the bank must obey the stop order, 19 and D may use
14. See Tonelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 86 Misc. 2d 680, 386 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct.
1975), aff'd, 53 A.D.2d 183, 386 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1976), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 667, 363 N.E.2d 564,
394 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1977).
15. "'Issue' means the first delivery of an instrument to a holder or a remitter." U.C.C. §
3-102(1)(a). '
16. See id. § 4-403. This section provides in pertinent part:
A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item payable for his account
but the order must be received at such time and in such manner as to afford the bank a
reasonable opportunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank with respect to the
item described in Section 4-303.
Id. § 4-403(1). For the text of U.C.C. § 4-303, see note 17 infra. In addition, the Uniform
Commercial Code limits the period of effectiveness of such an offer: "An oral order is binding
upon the bank only for fourteen calendar days unless confirmed in writing within that period. A
written order is effective for only six months unless renewed in writing." U.C.C. § 4-403(2).
17. See UC.C. § 4-303(1). This section provides in pertinent part:
Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal process served upon or setoff
exercised by a payor bank . . . comes too late . . . if the knowledge, notice, stop-order
or legal process is received or served and a reasonable time for the bank to act thereon
expires . . .after the bank has done any of the following:
(a) accepted or certified the item;
(b) paid the item in cash;
(c) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the settlement and with-
out having such right under statute, clearing house rule or agreement;
(d) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated account of the drawer,
maker or other person to be charged therewith or otherwise has evidenced by
examination of such indicated account and by action its decision to pay the item;
or
(e) become accountable for the amount of the item .. .[by failure to revoke a provi-
sional settlement or failure to return an item within an applicable time period].
Id.
18. See id. § 3-802(1)(b). Unless the parties agree otherwise, the underlying obligation is
suspended until the check is presented. Id. The drawer, however, is liable if the check is
dishonored. See id.
19. See note 16 supra.
4
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the funds in his checking account to pay AP. D could also invoke a
less formal means of countermand by merely requesting that P not
present the check. That approach, however, has the potential draw-
back that P may refuse to accede to the request.
Less difficult, at least theoretically, is the situation where D has
not delivered the check to P. In that case, it would appear that D
remains the owner and controller of the instrument, 20 at least absent
20. This should be true notwithstanding loose language in cases like Stone & Webster Eng'r
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962), which dealt with
the altogether different issue of whether a drawer may sue a collecting bank in conversion. Id.
at 5, 184 N.E.2d at 361. Unfortunately, language appropriate in one context is likely to be
misappropriated to another. The court suggested:
Here the plaintiff drawer of the checks, which were never delivered to the payee . . .
had no valuable right to them. Since .. . it did not have the right of a payee or sub-
sequent holder to present them to the drawee for payment, the value of its rights was
limited to the physical paper on which they were written, and was not measured by their
payable amounts.
Id. at 8, 184 N.E.2d at 362 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
That statement is sound when the question is whether the drawer can sue a depositary
bank in conversion for "cashing" a forged check. The drawer and the collecting bank have never
dealt with each other and the drawer has rights against the drawee bank if it fails to detect the
forger, subject to drawee defenses which might not operate in favor of the depositary.
Moreover, the drawer's intent has been more frustrated by the forger than by the depositary
bank. Since an "innocent" drawer ultimately will recover the improper payment from his bank,
which may in turn recover from the depositary bank, it does not seem harsh to limit the
drawer's rights against the depositary to the value of the paper representing his fund. This does
not mean, however, that no valuable rights exist or that all attributes of ownership are curtailed.
It may in fact be urged that although the drawer has no right to payment, other "valuable
rights" are present. For example, the drawer retains both the right to stop payment on the
checks by informing the drawee of the loss or theft and the right to sue the thief or even an
innocent finder. Without quarreling with the result in Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., one
nevertheless may wince at its language, particularly since the Fifth Circuit relied on it to rebut
an "ownership rights" argument of a drawer:
Although it is clear this case presents no prospect of a true payee raising a superior
claim to payment of these checks, [appellant] Perini attempts somehow to raise such a
claim in its own name, asserting conclusorily that the checks belong to it.
Perini, however, has no claim to payment on the checks. The drawer of a valid order
instrument cannot demand payment from the drawee . . . . [citing Stone & Webster
Eng'r Corp.]. Similarly, one whose pre-printed checks are stolen owns the piece of paper,
but the order of payment created by the thief who forges the drawer's signature does not
run to the victim.
Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 413 n.22 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). The
point, of course, is that the drawer of an authorized check or the person whose name has been
forged as drawer does indeed have ownership rights. As this article will develop, those rights
may even include the right to receive payment from the drawee instead of the named payee
under certain circumstances. The proposition advanced in both Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp.
and Perini, highly appropriate for the achievement of the desired results in those cases, be-
comes at best too broad and at worst incorrect when uttered as a general rule.
The drawer in Perini sought to hold a depositary bank liable on improper indorsements.
Id. at 408-16. The drawer argued that, although no payee existed to challenge an alleged im-
proper payment, the drawer should nevertheless be able to challenge the improper indorse-
ments on a theory of ownership rights. Id. at 413-14, 414 n.22. The court failed to give suffi-
cient consideration to this challenge, but it correctly determined that in the particular case the
ownership rights did not.matter. Id. at 414.
The Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. principle was also transformed by the court in Johnson
v. State, 304 N.E.2d 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973), an appeal from a criminal theft conviction, id. at
556, into the following: "The landmark case interpreting this uniform code section [U.C.C.
5
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theft or loss.2 l If that is true, D can simply destroy or otherwise
void the check as originally drawn and write a new check to AP.
Since the act of drawing a check has no effect on the finds rep-
resented thereby, 22 D has managed to "change" the payee, so that
AP receives the funds represented by the check. Of course, D still
remains liable to P for any unsatisfied obligation for which the original
check was issued.2 3  The act of voiding the paper will cost D only the
amount of money he pays for the check, not the dollar amount of the
instrument.
Two other ways to manage the problem of redirection would be
for D to add his own name or AP's name as an alternative payee, 24 or
to add words sufficient to make the instrument bearer paper.2 5 Either
method would permit D to negotiate 2 6 the check and redirect the
funds to AP. 27 These two alternatives have the advantage of saving
the costs associated with the destruction of the check or the stoppage
of payment and can also qualify AP for holder in due course status.
2 8
Still another legitimate, yet highly curious, method of redirection
is for D to obliterate P's name from the check and insert AP's. If D is
neat, AP and all subsequent takers could ostensibly take as holders in
due course. Even if D makes an obvious change, so that AP and
others cannot claim holder in due course status, 29 D, as the person
3-419] is Stone .. .which held that the 'true owner' of a check is the payee .... . Id. at 562.
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
21, See note 20 supra. See also note 33 infra.
22, U.C.C. § 3-409(1). A check does not represent an assignment of any funds which the
drawee has for its payment. Id.
23, See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
24, U.C.C. § 3-110 provides in part that an instrument may be payable to the order of"two
or more payees together or in the alternative." Id. § 3-110(1)(d). Additionally, an instrument
which is payable to two or more persons "in the alternative is payable to any one of them and
may be negotiated, discharged or enforced by any of them who has possession of it." Id. §
3-116(a).
25. Inserting "or bearer" or similar words after P's name ought to be sufficient. See U.C.C.
§ 3-111. The Uniform Commercial Code (Code) defines the word bearer as "the person in
possession of any instrument, document of title, or security payable to bearer or indorsed in
blank." Id. § 1-201(5). The Code, however, places a limitation on bearer paper by providing
that "[a]n instrument made payable both to order and to bearer is payable to order unless the
bearer words are handwritten or typewritten." Id. § 3-110(3). See also id. § 3-110, Comment 6.
26. "Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee becomes a
holder." Id. § 3-202(1).
27. If D names himself as alternative payee, negotiation would occur by his indorsing the
check and delivering it to AP. See id. In the case of D adding bearer words, negotiation would
occur solely by delivery to AP. See id.
28. See id. For the Uniform Commercial Code's definition of a holder in due course, see id.
§ 3-302. See note 29 infra.
29. A holder in due course must, among other things, take without notice of defenses
against or claims to the instrument. U.C.C. § 3 -302(1)(c), Such notice exists if"the instrument is
so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular
as to call into question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party
to pay .... " Id. § 3-304(1)(a). It should be noted that the key is not whether the instrument
6
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making the change, should be precluded from asserting this as a de-
fense against a drawee bank which subsequently honors the check.
30
Since it is the drawer who redirects the funds, the check is properly
payable although it does not appear so, and the drawee may recover
the amount of the check from the drawer. 31  The net effect is as if D
had destroyed the check and written a new one. No cases are to be
found which deal with this method of redirection, indicating either
that people do not ordinarily utilize it or that banks dishonor such
checks upon presentment and private settlement occurs.3 2
The final successful, but least acceptable, method of funds redi-
rection shall be termed implied funds redirection. It assumes that D
could have redirected the funds by inserting his own name as alterna-
tive payee or by adding bearer words on the check, but did not.
Rather, he merely indorsed the check in his own name, even though
it was payable to the order of P. By doing so, D has implied that he
no longer wants the money represented thereby to go to P. It is
unclear, however, to whom he intends the money to pass. If implied
has been altered, see id. § 3-407, or is irregular, but whether it looks as if it has been altered or
is irregular. See notes 211-31 and accompanying text infra.
It may legitimately be asked whether notice of a defect should preclude holder in due
course status if the alteration is in reality not a defect. For a discussion of this problem relative
to overdue status, as opposed to notice of defenses, see Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31
HARV. L. REV. 1104, 1122 (1918).
30. This result would arise under common principles of estoppel. One might also argue that
even if no taker could be a holder in due course, the instrument could nevertheless be enforced
according to its original tenor under U.C.C. § 3-407(2)(b). See notes 198-200 and accompanying
text infra.
31. What ought to be done in an ideal world will not always correspond with what is actu-
ally done. A drawee bank which takes an obviously altered check does so either in error or
upon the presenter's word. To create the fiction in either case that the check was properly
payable because the drawer, and not someone else, altered it is to indulge in the worst kind of
tautology. It is not too difficult to theorize as to the "right" result after the fact with the benefit
of hindsight. It is another thing altogether to suggest to a bank that it should honor checks that
do not look properly payable on the chance that they are because the alterations effectuate the
drawer's intent. In terms of planning, therefore, a bank probably should dishonor a check where
the payee's name has been obliterated. If that is not feasible without harming the bank-cus-
tomer relationship, the bank should be prepared to bear any loss caused by honoring an improp-
erly payable item. However, the mere fact that an error has been made or that the bank chose
to believe the customer should not deprive the mistaken bank of all remedy. See text accom-
panying notes 267-69 infra.
32. If it is correct that the drawee bank which honors a check with P's name obliterated and
AP's name inserted may recover from the drawer, quaere whether the drawer could bring an
action against a bank which refuses to honor the check. See U.C.C. 4-402; notes 245-66 and
accompanying text infra.
Oral funds redirection may also be possible. For example, suppose Corporation A is headed
by X who is also a director of Corporation B. Corporation B draws a check payable to Bank in
payment of a debt to Bank. X then calls Bank and orally instruct it to change the payee to
Corporation A. Bank applies the funds to Corporation A which later goes bankrupt. Corporation
B then challenges payment on the ground that the funds reached the wrong payee. One must
ask whether the oral redirection should be sufficient to change the payee. Corporation B may
be estopped from challenging the redirection. Section 4-403(2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, id. § 4-403(2), gives a customer the right to countermand payment orally. Id. Whether the
customer should also be able to redirect orally is debatable.
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funds redirection is to be successful, one of two views must be ac-
cepted. Either the paper must be treated as bearer paper after the
redirection-indorsement, which is probably the preferable view, or
the redirection must be given effect only if D in fact delivers it to
AP. 3 3 The difficulty is that here, unlike in the prior illustrations, the
intent of the drawer cannot be divined with any certainty from the
instrument. The best advice to a bank is not to take such paper. If a
bank does accept the check, it should be properly chargeable against
D's account because it represents D's redirection.
The question of whether a drawee bank can charge its customer's
account is important not only in adjusting the rights of the drawer-
drawee, but also those of the drawee vis-a-vis the collecting banks.
34
If the drawer's intent has been effectuated, the drawee should be
able to charge the drawer's account and all prior transferors will be
discharged from any possible liability. 35  This may not solve the pro-
blem of what to do when a collecting bank accepts a check which
attempts funds redirection, and the drawee bank then refuses pay-
ment because the check "looks" bad.36 It could be argued that each
collecting bank has recourse against its transferor and that this chain
would eventually lead to the drawer, who could undo any harm.
3 7 If
the drawer alone is not capable of undoing the harm, 38 however, the
collecting banks will want to force the drawee to honor the check as
drawn. The power of collecting banks to do this is discussed later in
this article.
39
A second and more important problem for the purposes of this
article is the effect of certification of the check on the ability of the
drawer to redirect the funds. 40 The type of redirection attempted
33. The anticipated problem is the loss or theft of the check after D's indorsement and
before delivery to AP. It could be argued that this possibility militates against allowing this
method of funds redirection at all, but once the drawer has indorsed the check, the result is not
much different from the all too common lost or stolen bearer paper dilemma. The risk of forgery
.remains on the drawee bank, while the risk of loss after indorsement remains on the loser of the
check. For cases in which the payee lost an indorsed check, see American Book Co. v. White
Sys. 223 Miss. 510, 78 So. 2d 582 (1955); Watkins v. Sheriff of Clark County, 85 Nev. 246, 453
P.2d 611 (1969); Unaka Nat'l Bank v. Butler, 113 Tenn. 574, 83 S.W. 655 (1904).
34. See U.C.C. § 4-401.
35. See id. §§ 3-601 to 3-606; H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 10.9, at 274-76.
36. Technically, this would not be a dishonor, unless funds redirection had been ac-
complished by the addition of drawer's name or bearer words as payee. U.C.C.§ 3-507, 4-401.
37.See id. § 4-207.
38. One reason for this inability would be the certification of the redirected check. It would
not be feasible for a drawee bank which certified a redirected check at the request of the
drawer to ask the drawer to reissue the check when the drawee bank later wants to revoke
certification. This is particularly true where the revocation of certification will leave the collect-
ing banks without hope of recovering their money.
39. See generally notes 159-81 and accompanying text infra.
40. See generally H, BAILEY, supra note 6, § 7.6, at 154-57.
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may determine whether redirection can occur. If the redirection is
effected tinder circumstances which enable subsequent takers to be
holders in due course, the drawee bank that certified the check
would seem powerless to object to redirection, other than complain-
ing to its customer, the drawer. 41 If the redirection does not leave
subsequent takers as potential holders in due course, the answer,
largely based on policy grounds, is probably the same. 42
Before these problems can be developed and discussed, the
rights and obligations of the drawee bank, the collecting banks, and
the drawer with respect to certified checks must be discussed. An
excellent vehicle for doing so is the recent New York case of Tonelli
v. Chase Manhattan Bank.
43
IlI. THE TONELLI DECISION
In Tonelli, the plaintiff, a union persion fund, drew two $100,000
checks on its account with the Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase) pay-
able to the order of Totowa Savings and Loan (Totowa) to be used for
the purchase of two certificates of deposit. 44 The checks were
marked "CD" 45 and entrusted to one Naiman, who was to deliver
them to Totowa in exchange for the certificates. 4 6 After having
Chase certify the checks, '7 Naiman met with Totowa's president and
requested that two certificates be issued, one in the name of the pen-
sion fund and one in the name of Playmate Enterprise Products, Inc.
(Playmate), 48 which Naiman asserted was a subsidiary of the fund.
49
Totowa's president denied the request, but suggested that the Play-
mate account could be opened if Naiman obtained a bank check or a
cashier's check for $100,000 payable to Totowa. 50  Naiman returned
to Chase, purporting to be a representative of Totowa, 51 and re-
quested that the certified check be replaced with a cashier's check for
41. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305; see notes 201-10 and accompanying text infra.
42. See notes 201-10 and accompanying text infra.
43. 86 Misc. 2d 680, 386 N.Y.S.2d 723 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aff'd, 53 A.D.2d 183, 386 N.Y.S.2d
424 (1976), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 667, 363 N.E.2d 564, 394 N.Y.S.2d 858 (1977).
44. 86 Misc. 2d at 681, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
45. 41 N.Y.2d at 668, 363 N.E.2d at 565, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
46. 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 41 N.Y.2d at 669, 363 N.E.2d at 566, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
50. 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724. Totowa's president consulted with a subordi-
nate who advised Naiman that the fund's certified check could not be used to open a Playmate
account. Id.
51. Id. If Naiman had held himself out as a representative of the fund it would have been
bound by his consent, given his apparent authority tinder principles of agency, to payment of
the check without indorsement. See H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 5.15, at 102-04; id., § 15.15, at
501-07. See also First Nat'l Bank v. Nicholas & Barrera, 500 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973),
[VOL. 24: 1). 28
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the same amount naming Totowa as payee. 52 Chase apparently
thought that Naiman was acting on behalf of the payee, which had
the right to request an exchange of the certified check for the
cashier's check, 53 or that the type of check issued was insignificant as
long as the payee remained the same. 54 The bank issued the
cashier's check, noting on the certified check "not used for purpose
intended." 55  The certified check was exchanged by Chase even
though it had not been indorsed by the payee, Totowa.
56
Naiman then returned to Totowa, delivered the cashier's check
in exchange for a $100,000 certificate of deposit made payable to
Playmate, borrowed $90,000 from Totowa using the Playmate account
as collateral, 57 and eventually defaulted on the loans. 58  The fund
later discovered that it had purchased only one certificate of deposit 5 9
and brought suit against Chase, alleging that Chase had been negli-
gent in exchanging the unindorsed certified check for the cashier's
check. 60 The fund's motion for summary judgment was granted by
the trial court, 61 affirmed by a split court at the intermediate level, 62
and affirmed unanimously by the Court of Appeals of New York. 63
The central issue raised by this case is whether a drawee is neg-
ligent if it exchanges an unindorsed certified check for a cashier's
check in the same amount made payable to the same payee.6 4  The
three courts that heard the case had difficulty not only in articulating
an answer, but also in formulating an underlying theory for it.
The Tonelli trial court began its analysis by suggesting that To-
towa would have been liable in conversion if it had allowed Naiman
to use the fund's certified check to open the Playmate account and
that Chase's exchange of checks without indorsement by the fund ac-
52. 86 Misc. 2d at 681, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
53. Since a cashier's check and a certified check are virtual equivalents, the requested ex-
change, more likely than not, would have been made. See note 7 supra.
54. In terms of value, this would be true. See notes 7 & 10 supra. However, a certified
check bearing the drawer fund's name would indicate that the fund was the issuer, thereby
suggesting to a taker that a certificate of deposit purchased with the check should also be issued
in the name of the fund. The cashier's check, on the other hand, would bear Chase's name as
drawer, and could as easily have been remitted by Naiman individually as by the fund. The lack
of identification of the drawer would theoretically make it easier for Naiman to defraud the
fund. See note 66 infra.
55. 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
56. Id.
57. Id. The president of Totowa made two loans of $80,000 and $10,000 to Playmate. Id.
58. 41 N.Y.2d at 669, 363 N.E.2d at 566, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
59. 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724. The fund had actually paid $200,000 for one
$100,000 certificate. Id.
60. Id. at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
61. Id. at 685, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
62. 53 A.D.2d at 184, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
63. 41 N.Y.2d at 673, 363 N.E.2d at 568, 394 N.Y. S.2d at 862.
64. See 86 Misc. 2d at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
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complished the same result. 65  It is not altogether clear that a con-
version would have occurred, and, even if it did occur, an innocent
converter 66 would be able to raise defenses against the drawer, in-
cluding that of the drawer's negligence in selecting a dishonest
65. Id. at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724-25.
66. Although it appears highly doubtful from the facts that Totowa was innocent, since both
Naiman and Totowa's president were indicted for conspiracy, it will be assumed that Totowa
had no prior knowledge of Naiman's scheme. Id. at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724. The question
then becomes whether the transferee of a check loses its innocent status by taking a check
which is then applied for the benefit of one other than the drawer. The general rule is that
there is no presumption of lack of innocence based upon the application of a check. See
Wysowatcky v. Denver-Willys, Inc., 131 Colo. 266, 269, 281 P.2d 165, 166 (1955); McConnico
v. Third Nat'l Bank, 499 S.W.2d 874, 881-83 (Tenn. 1973); Schneider Fuel & Supply Co. v.
West Allis State Bank, 70 Wis. 2d 1041, 1049-50, 236 N.W.2d 266, 270-71 (1975).
If there is no presumption against innocence, the next question is whether the applica-
tion constitutes sufficient notice to preclude holder in due course status. It is one thing to say
that no inference of mala fides arises; it is quite another to say that a transferee can still be a
holder in due course. U.C.C. § 3-304(2) is instructive: "The purchaser has notice of a claim
against the instrument when he has knowledge that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in
payment of or as security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise
in breach of duty." Id. Section 3-304(4)(e) of the Code, U.C.C. § 3-304(4)(e), qualifies this
somewhat by providing that knowledge that a person negotiating the instrument is or was a
fiduciary does not of itself give the purchaser notice of a defense or claim. Id. It becomes
apparent from these sections that the transferee must actually know that the transferor is a
fiduciary and that he is negotiating the instrument in breach of his fiduciary duty. See id. §
3-304 (4)(e). This should require more than a mere showing that a check was drawn by X but
used for Y, although cases can be found which erroneously dilute the knowledge requirement.
See, e.g., Mott Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 259 N.W.2d 667, 671 (N.D. 1977);
Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 55 Tenn. App. 545, 551-56, 403 S.W.2d 109, 112-15 (1966).
New York courts may vary this knowledge requirement by requiring a payee to inquire
as to the use of a check drawn by one person, but presented by and used for the benefit of
another. See Borrello v. Perera Co., 381 F. Supp. 1226, 1232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd per
curiam, 512 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1975); Sims v. United States Trust Co., 103 N.Y. 472, 477-78, 9
N.E. 605, 606-07 (1886); Federal Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank, 44 A.D.2d 182, 186-89, 354
N.Y.S.2d 220, 224-28 (1974). See also American Sur. Co. v. Smith, Landeryou & Co., 141 Neb.
719, 723, 4 N.W.2d 889, 893 (1942). Failure to inquire results in the loss of innocent status and
may subsequently cause loss of holder in due course status.
This inquiry requirement may be viewed in four ways. First, the duty to inquire may
graft an additional step onto § 3-304 (4 )(e). Under this analysis, the purchaser, who has knowl-
edge that the negotiating person is a fiduciary but fails to inquire into the use of the funds, is
deemed to have knowledge under § 3-304(2). A second analysis which is perhaps more consis-
tent with §§ 3-304(2) and 3-304(4)(e) interprets that payee's failure to inquire as an absolute
presumption of knowledge of fiduciary breach. Although this may comport well with 3-304, it is
not consistent with § 1-201(25) of the Code, U.C.C. § 1-201(25), which defines knowledge as
"actual knowledge." Id. Under a third view, the receipt of the instrument without inquiry as to
its use is considered an absolute bar to holder in due course status purely on policy grounds.
Finally, the rule may be explained as an aberration unique to New York and Nebraska which
does not affect holder in due course status, but merely blocks innocent converter status. For a
"non-innocent" converter, holder in due course status may be unachievable according to dictum
in Federal Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank, 44 A.D.2d 182, 354 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1974), that
bona fide purchaser status is ineffective as a defense to failure to inquire. Id. at 188-89, 354
N.Y.S.2d at 227.
This dedsction may not be totally accurate, however, for no New York case can be
found which specifically addresses the problem. It is suggested that the better analysis is to
suggest a two-tiered approach. One must first ask whether the taker is an innocent or a culpable
converter. If culpable, the inquiry ends. If innocent, the question becomes whether he might
nevertheless qualify as a holder in due course. The answer to that may consider the manner of
11
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agent. 67  Moreover, a converter who qualifies as a holder in due
course 6 8 may take the check free of the drawer's defense of delivery
for a special purpose. 69 Had the trial court continued its conversion
analysis, it might have found that, absent actual knowledge of the
fraud, the drawer fund and not Totowa, the.payee-converter, should
bear the loss. 70  The court would then have faced the issue of
receipt so that one who takes under sufficiently unusual circumstances will be barred from
holder in due course status. However, the inquiry allows the taker who has given value and
taken in good faith to be accorded the respect traditionally reserved for good faith purchasers.
See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
This analysis shows that if Totowa had no knowledge of Naiman's intent, it was in the
position of a New York innocent converter which must establish holder in due course status.
Totowa should therefore neither lose its innocence nor risk its holder in due course status by
taking the fund's check to open an account in the name of Playmate. Even if Totowa knew that
Naiman was a fiduciary, it did not know that the delivery of the certified check was in violation
of a fiduciary duty. It should be noted that § 3-304 may not even apply here since no negotia-
tion has occurred. See Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 137, 207 N.W.2d 282, 287 (1973). Without a finding that Totowa
was privy to Naiman's scheme, its taking of the fund's check and applying it to the Playmate
account would not affect its holder in due course status.
A different result occurs in the second transaction, where Totowa lent money to Naiman
using the Playmate account as collateral. See 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724. Since
Naiman's debt was personal, Totowa had the requisite knowledge that he was violating his
fiduciary duty, thus precluding holder in due course status as to the certificate.
67. The Court of Appeals in Tonelli pointed out that this defense was not available to Chase
since the instrument could not be negotiated without the payee's indorsement, although it
would be available to an innocent converter. 41 N.Y.2d at 671-72, 363 N.E.2d at 567-68, 394
N.Y.S.2d at 861-62.
68. See U.C.C. § 3-302(1)-(2). Totowa could not qualify as a holder in due course if it had
actual knowledge of Naiman's fraud or attempted fraud. See id. § 3-302(1). The converter who
does qualify as a holder in due course must demonstrate that it has not dealt with the drawer if
it is to take the instrument free of the drawer's defenses. Id. § 3-305. Totowa would have little
difficulty in showing that it had not dealt with the find, given the intercession of Naiman. See
Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn.
130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973). For a discussion of this case, see note 70 infra. See also E.
FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW 231 (2d ed.
1976), construing U.C.C. § 3-302, Comment 2 and id. § 3-305.
69. See U.C.C. § 3-305.
70. An Official Comment to U.C.C. § 3-302 gives the following illustration of when a payee
is a holder in due course:
D draws a check payable to P and gives it to his agent to be delivered to P in
payment of D's debt. The agent delivers it to P, who takes it in good faith and without
notice in payment of the agent's debt to P. But as to this case see Section 3-304(2), which
may apply.
Id., Comment 2. This example would be similar to Tonelli, if Totowa had acted innocently.
Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 296 Minn.
130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973), discusses the application of U.C.C. § 3-304(2). 296 Minn. at
137-40, 207 N.W.2d at 287-89. The plaintiff drew a check for the purchase of stocks payable to
the defendant brokerage firm and gave it to its own lawyer for delivery. Id. at 131-32, 207
N.W.2d at 284. The lawyer used the check to purchase securities for himself. Id. at 132, 207
N.W.2d at 285. After plaintiff had inquired of the brokerage firm about the stock certificate, it
sued the defendant payee, seeking to be declared the owner of the stocks purchased with the
check. Id. at 133, 207 N.W.2d at 285. The plaintiff claimed that defendant had notice of plain-
tiff's ownership, since the check was drawn by the plaintiff. Id. at 134, 207 N.W.2d at 285. The
court first noted that § 3-304(2) or U.C.C. § 3-304(4)(e) might not apply because the check was
12
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whether the drawee's conceded negligence shifted the loss to it, 71
and it might well have concluded that the fund should bear the loss
and that Chase, the drawee, was immune.
Instead, the trial court in Tonelli considered the result if Chase
had refused to exchange the unindorsed certified check for its
cashier's check and had insisted on Totowa's indorsement. 72 The trial
judge determined that an indorsement would have offered the fund
protection. 73 The Uniform Commercial Code (Code), however,
would not yield the conclusion reached by the trial court judge.
74
not negotiated, and then suggested that the question was whether defendant had either actual
knowledge of the drawer's claim or knowledge of facts from which the drawer's claim could be
inferred. 296 Minn. at 134-35, 138, 207 N.W.2d at 286, 288. The court concluded that:
Merrill Lynch did not have "notice of any claim of the drawer, Eldon's, simply by virtue
of its receipt of the check and confirmation notice from Drexler. The fact that Merrill
Lynch was the named payee on the check drawn by Eldon's did not in and of itself
constitute "notice" that Drexler was using the check improperly.
Id. at 138-39, 207 N.W.2d at 288.
The court then held that:
Under the circumstances of this case, namely, where (1) a bank check was delivered to
the payee by the drawer's agent with the drawer's consent and knowledge, (2) the check
itself contained no restrictions or designations as to its use, and (3) the payee, a stock
brokerage firm, had no trading account with, or indebtedness to, the drawer, we hold
that the payee took the check without notice of the drawer's claims. Thus, the payee
became a holder in due course of the instrument.
Id. at 140, 207 N.W.2d at 289. See also Breslin v. New Jersey Investors, Inc., 70 N.J. 466,
470-71, 361 A.2d 1, 3 (1976).
The designation "CD" on the check in Tonelli v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 41 N.Y.2d
667, 668, 363 N.E.2d 564, 565, 394 N.Y.S.2d 858, 859 (1977), may be sufficient to distinguish
Tonelli from Eldon's. See Western Sur. Co. v. Friederichs, 241 Minn. 492, 497-98, 63 N.W.2d
565, 568-69 (1954) (check naming remitter held not to give notice to taker of misapplication of
funds).
71. There would seem to be no basis for shifting the loss except on the policy ground that
the drawee, as a bank, is better able to bear the loss. In fact, all relevant considerations would
point to the conclusion that the loss should remain on the drawer. The court is justified in
leaving equally innocent, or equally negligent, parties where it finds them. See Holly v.
Missionary Soc'y, 180 U.S. 284, 295 (1901); Mattawan Mfg. Co. v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co.,
244 A.D. 404, 410, 279 N.Y.S. 495, 502 (1935), modified on other grounds, 272 N.Y. 411, 3
N.E.2d 845 (1936); Roberts v. Sterr, 312 P.2d 449, 451 (Okla. 1957). Moreover, U.C.C. § 4-407
would seem to subrogate the payor bank, Chase, to the rights of the holder in due course if
such a holder exists:
If a payor bank has paid an item .. .under circumstances giving a basis for objection
by the drawer . . . , to prevent unjust enrichment and only to the extent necessary to
prevent loss to the bank by reason of its payment of the item, the payor bank shall be
subrogated to the rights
(a) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer . . .; and
(b) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer ....
Id. One must first ask whether the drawer would have a basis for objection, even though the
check is improperly payable. See id. § 4-407, Comment 5. Assuming the drawer may object, the
question is whether unjust enrichment or a loss will occur absent subrogation. Here, the bank
will incur a loss if there is no subrogation. Unjust enrichment of the drawer will occur to the
extent that one accepts the premise that it is equitable for the drawer to bear the loss as against
the innocent payee-converter, for then it is unjust to allow the drawer to avoid the loss.
72. 86 Misc. 2d at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
73. Id. at 683-84, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
74. See notes 75-97 and accompanying text infra.
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If Chase had refused to accept the unindorsed certified check
from Naiman, one of three things would likely have occurred. First,
Naiman might have returned to Totowa and purchased a certificate of
deposit in the name of the fund which he should have done initially.
Second, he might have informed Totowa's president that its indorse-
ment was required. If Totowa refused to indorse the check, Naiman
would have been in the same position as if he had never gone back to
Totowa. If Totowa indorsed the check, it would have proven that
Totowa had received the check, which might have aided the fund in a
conversion action. Indorsement would also have enabled Chase to be-
come a holder in due course of the check. 75  The indorsed check
would have been properly payable in any event, and Chase would
therefore have had the right, under the Code, to charge the fund's
account. 76 The fund's only recourse would have been an action for
conversion against Totowa and not against Chase.
The third and perhaps most likely course of action available to
Naiman if Chase had refused to accept the unindorsed certified check
would have been to forge Totowa's indorsement. If Chase then hon-
ored the check, it would have been liable for paying over a forged
indorsement. 77 Chase also could have attempted to avail itself of
traditional defenses against the drawer and the payee. 78 Whether
75. See U.C.C. § 3-302(1). A holder in due course is one who takes the instrument for
value, in good faith and "without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any
defense against or claim to it on the part of any person." Id. Totowa's indorsement would have
made negotiation of the check possible since an instrument which "is payable to order ... is
negotiated by delivery with any necessary indorsement." Id. § 3-202. Value was given by Chase
since it issued the cashier's check. See 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724. See U.C.C. §
3-303(c). Moreover, Chase took the check in good faith. See id. § 1-201(19). Chase also took
without notice. See id. § 3-304. An argument that Chase had notice because it refused the
exchange after seeing the unindorsed check would be untenable since return for lack of in-
dorsement is not dishonor for purposes of § 3-302(1). See id. § 3-507(3).
76. See U.C.C. § 4-401. This discussion assumes that the money represented by the cer-
tified check was still in the fund's account. Ordinarily, the drawer's account is debited upon
certification, and a "certified check account" is credited. See 5B MICHIE ON BANKS & BANKING,
§ 256(b), at 21-22 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MICHIE]. An interesting question is whether that
account constitutes a customer's account, so that the check must in fact be "properly payable"
under the provisions of U.C.C. § 4-401 before the certified check account can be charged. The
court in Tone/li stated the facts so as to lead one to believe either that Chase had not charged
the find's account at the time of certification or that if the account had been debited, it was
recredited when the certified check was presented for exchange and then redebited on the
issuance of the cashier's check. See 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724. If the latter were
the case, it would clearly have been improper for Chase to issue the cashier's check, for it
would then have been analogous to honoring the order of one not authorized to withdraw
money from the fund's checking account. Counsel for Chase indicate in their brief that a cer-
tified check account was used. Brief for Appellant at 4. Appreciation is due Andrew J. Connick,
Esquire, of the firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy for making a copy of their brief
available.
77. See U.C.C. §§ 3-404, 4-401.
78. Chase would have been able to urge the substantial negligence of both the Fund and
Totowa in giving Naiman the check. See id. § 3-406. Moreover, it could be argued that the
14
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the drawee wins or loses in this context is of little import since the
law of forged indorsements at least is firmly established.
79
Rather than stand on this firm ground, however, the Tonelli trial
court focused on what would have happened if Chase had insisted on
receiving Totowa's indorsement. 80 At that point, the court stated,
proper presentment would have occurred and negotiation would have
been possible. 8 ' The court then made the startling remark that
"[u]nder those circumstances, a number of warranties would have
arisen by operation of law in favor of Chase and, derivatively, in favor
of the fund, Chase's depositor." '82 First, the court said, Totowa
would have warranted that it had title. 83  Second, and more signifi-
canty, the court agreed that Totowa's indorsement would have resulted in
a warranty under section 3-417(2)(d) of the Code 8 4 that no defense of
any party is good against the warrantor.8 5  The court indicated that
these warranties would somehow have enabled the fund to claim
more than negligence or conversion against Totowa. 86  Since Chase
did not insist upon the indorsement, the court reasoned that it prox-
imately caused the fund's loss. 8 7  Finally, and most remarkably, the
court concluded:
Chase's failure to avail itself of the safeguards and warranties
which are specifically provided in the Uniform Commercial Code is
the proximate cause of Totowa's present ability to argue that it
never received the proceeds of the Fund's check. Had Chase ob-
tained a proper indorsement, Totowa would have no such defense
... and there would be clear evidence on the instrument itself
that Totowa had, in fact, received the proceeds and benefits of the
Fund's check. In the present case, there was no such evidence and
the lack of an indorsement, in and of itself, provides prima facie
evidence that the proceeds of the check did not reach the intended
payee. Chase had failed to present any evidence whatsoever to the
contrary and, accordingly, was not entitled to pay the check out of
the Fund's account.
88
drawer and the payee should be precluded from complaining since the payee did receive the
proceeds of the check. See text accompanying note 113 infra. This argument was raised in
Tonelli and failed. 41 N.Y.2d at 671, 363 N.E.2d at 567, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 861. See also Hillsley
v. State Bank, 24 A.D.2d 28, 263 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1965).
79. See U.C.C. § 3-404(1). See generally H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 15.7, at 470-74.
80. 86 Misc. 2d at 683-84, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725-26.
81. Id. at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725. See U.C.C. § 3-302.
82. 86 Misc. 2d at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
83. Id. at 683-84, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
84. U.C.C. § 3-417(2)(d). See note 91 infra.
85. 86 Misc. 2d at 684, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725, construing U.C.C. § 3-417.
86. 86 Misc. 2d at 684, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 684-85, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725-26 (citation omitted), citing U.C.C. § 3-417(2).
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The court's analysis of the scenario is disturbing. Although it is
certain that Totowa, had it indorsed the certified check, would indeed
have made certain warranties to Chase, it is far less certain that those
warranties would have inured to the benefit of the drawer, the fund.
Indeed, the warranties of sections 3-417 9 and 4-207,90 which are es-
sentially the same in this instance, are specifically said to run to
payors, acceptors, and subsequent transferees. 91 These warranties run
downstream only and do not run back upstream to the drawer. 92 In
addition, these warranties are for the protection of transferees and not
of the payor bank. Indeed, one commentator has stated that "[a]
payor bank cannot rely on the warranties embodied in 4-207(2) (or in
3-417(2)) because those warranties do not run to payors. Although
one might argue that the word 'transferee' . . . includes a payor bank
. . . , the Code draftsmen quite clearly did not intend the word
transferee' to include a payor."
93
Although the Tonelli trial court spoke of the warranty of good
title in the hypothetical event of a genuine indorsement by Totowa, 94
that warranty was not at issue in the case.9 5  Since both the good
title and the 3-417(2)96 warranties were unavailable, it becomes clear
that no warranties given would have been breached even if Totowa
had indorsed the check.9 7  Even if the warranties in favor of Chase
89. U.C.C. § 3-417.
90. Id. § 4-207.
91. Id. § 3-417, 4-207. Section 3-417 details the warranties provided on presentment and
transfer to a payor, acceptor, or transferee. Id. § 3-417. Section 4-207 specifies the warranties
provided by a customer or collecting bank on the transfer or presentment of items. Id. § 4-207.
92. See id. §§ 3-417, 4-207; J. WHITE & B. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
15-5, at 509-14 (1972). See also Nida v. Michael, 34 Mich. App. 290, 296, 191 N.W.2d 151, 155
(1971); Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 141 N.J. Super. 539, 542, 358 A.2d 859, 860-61 (1976). It is
possible to adopt a third party beneficiary, assignment, or subrogation theory which would offer
the fund the benefit of any warranty action the drawee might have. That possiblity, however,
might: 1) be unfair, for it would leave Totowa with the burden of proving the fund's negligence;
2) be unnecessary, since the fund may already have an action against Totowa in tort; and 3) be
unrealistic, since Totowa would have breached no warranty it made to Chase. See notes 82-91
and accompanying text supra; notes 93-97 and accompanying text infra.
93. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 92, § 15-5, at 511. See also Federal Ins. Co. v.
Groveland State Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 252, 260, 333 N.E.2d 334, 338, 372 N.Y.S.2d 18, 24 (1975)
(warranty intended primarily to permit drawee to recover from party presenting instrument
with forged indorsement).
94. 86 Misc. 2d at 684, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
95. One commentator has stated that a warranty of good title will "[i]n nine-tenths of the
cases .. . mean no more than: 'this check bears no forged indorsement." J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 92, § 15-5, at 510 (footnote omitted). See id. at 510 n.37. See also Federal
Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 252, 260, 333 N.E.2d 334, 338, 372 N.Y.S.2d 18,
24 (1975).
96. U.C.C. § 3-417(2).
97. If one accepts that § 3-417(2) warranties are unavailable, the possible warranty liabilities
available to Chase are limited to good title, i.e., no forged indorsement, no knowledge of unau-
thorized drawer's signature, and no material alterations. See id. § 4-207(1). The facts indicate
that none of those warranties was breached.
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somehow inured to the fund's benefit, they would provide no assis-
tance to the fund. Since the lack of warranties formed the basis for
the trial court's decision, that should have been sufficient to cause the
appellate court to reverse.
98
The opinion of the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court focused not on the warranty issue, however, but rather on the
misapplication of the proceeds. 99 The dissenting opinion, however,
shifted the emphasis by suggesting that the real question was whether
the purpose of the drawer had been effected, and, if not, whether the
drawer or Chase was more at fault. 100 Under that reasoning, the
case assumed the character of a funds redirection problem and the
question became whether the redirector had the power to redirect,
even though he had no right to do so. Since the drawer's expressed
purpose was effectuated through the transaction, i.e., the intended
payee received the funds, the drawer was not harmed by the ex-
change of certified check for cashier's check. 1 1 Any harm suffered
did not result from Chase's act or omission, but was attributable to
Totowa's negligence in accepting the cashier's check knowing that it
represented the exchanged certified check. 102 According to the dis-
sent, therefore, Chase ought to prevail10 3 and Hillsley v. State
Bank, 104 a case involving forged payee's indorsement, 10 5 was not ap-
posite. 106
The majority disagreed, apparently adopting the lower court's
warranty theory, and proceeded to explain how Hillsley was analo-
gous. 107  Hillsley involved a check payable to Hillsley and Glennon
as joint payees. 108  Glennon forged Hillsley's indorsement, ex-
changed the check for a cashier's check payable to Hillsley, and deli-
vered the check to Hillsley in partial satisfaction of a debt.10 9 When
98. The trial court noted that Chase's failure to insist on indorsement and its accompanying
warranties were "the proximate cause of Totowa's present ability to argue that it never received
the proceeds of the fund's check." 86 Misc. 2d at 684, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 725. This dictum was
rendered irrelevant by the Court of Appeals, which assumed that Totowa did receive the pro-
ceeds and rested its decision on the "purpose of the drawer," irrespective of whether Totowa
received the actual cash. 41 N.Y.2d at 671, 363 N.E.2d at 567, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 861. See text
accompanying note 88 supra.
99. 53 A.D.2d at 184-85, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 425-26.
100. Id. at 185-87, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 426-27 (Markewich, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 186, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (Markewich, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 187, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (Markewich, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 186-87, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (Markewich, J., dissenting).
104. 24 A.D.2d 28, 263 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1965).
105. Id. at 29-30, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 578-80.
106. 53 A.D.2d at 187, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 427 (Markewich, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 184, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 425-26.
108. 24 A.D.2d at 29, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80. The check represented a progress payment
due Hillsley on a home he was building for Glennon. Id.
109. Id.
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Hillsley discovered the forged indorsement, 110 he sued Glennon and
the collecting bank."' The collecting bank defended on grounds that
it should not be liable in damages since Hillsley, the intended payee,
in fact received the proceeds, albeit for a purpose not intended by
the drawer.112 The court disagreed, noting that the bank had failed
to establish that the plaintiff had not been damaged.'
13
The majority in the intermediate Tonelli opinion apparently be-
lieved that Hillsley was sufficiently analogous to Tonelli to preclude
the distinctions raised by the dissent as to the pure law question.
1 14
There are, however, a number of factual and legal distinctions which
tend to make Hillsley far less supportive of the Tonelli result than the,
appellate division believed.
115
First, whereas Hillsley involved a forged indorsement, 116 in To-
nelli there was no indorsement at all. 117 The drawee which pays
over a forged indorsement ordinarily cannot charge its customer, 118
and the payment constitutes a conversion giving rise to a cause of
action in the payee or other true owner. 119 The appellate division
majority failed to realize that its partial analogy to the forged in-
dorsement cases deprived the defendant not only of the defense that
the payee actually received the funds, but also of all other forged
indorsement defenses.12 0  A second and perhaps more important dis-
tinction between the two cases is the factual setting of Hillsley.
Whereas the Hilisley plaintiff was the payee of the original check,
12 1
110. Id. at 30, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 580. Hillsley demanded the balance due on the home con-
tract from its owner who then showed Hillsley the check with the forged indorsement. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 30, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 581. The bank admittedly took the check over a forged
indorsement and therefore had converted the check. Id. This case arose prior to the effective
date of the Code in New York. See U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (if converter acts in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards, his liability in conversion is limited to
amount of proceeds still in his hands).
113, 24 A.D.2d at 31-32, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82.
114, See 53 A.D.2d at 184-85, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 425-26.
115. See notes 116-25 and accompanying text infra.
116, 24 A.D.2d at 29-30, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80.
117, 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
118. U.C.C. §§ 3-404(1), 4-401(1). See also E. FARNSWORTH & J. HONNOLD, supra note 68,
at 316-17. The doctrine that payment over a forged indorsement is improper is based on the fact
that such payment is not in accord with the drawer's direction to pay only according to the
order of a named payee. Id.
119. U.C.C. § 3-419(1)(c). As a defense to such an action, the drawee can prove that the
drawer or true owner was negligent and that the negligence substantially contributed to the
making of the unauthorized signature or forged indorsement. See id. The drawee must also
show that it took in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. Id. §
3-406. Moreover, the authority of the signer to act as a representative of the person whose
name is signed can be raised by the drawee. Id. § 3-404.
120. See note 119 supra.
121. 24 A.D.2d at 29-30, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 579-80.
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the Tonelli plaintiff was the drawer.' 22 While the law is clear that a
payee has a cause of action in conversion for payment over a forged
indorsement, 123 it is far less clear that a drawer had the same
right. 124  The case was clearly distinguishable from Tonelli, 125 and,
for reasons of equity alone, the appellate division court should have
reversed the trial court. It did not, however, and the case was ap-
pealed to New York's highest court.
The Court of Appeals of New York, after reciting the facts,
126
began its opinion by holding that the certified check was not charge-
able against the fimd's account since it lacked a necessary indorse-
ment and was therefore not properly payable. 127 Although it is true
that no check is properly payable without the necessary indorsement
of the payee, there is a long standing rule of estoppel that prevents
the drawer from asserting improper payment when the intended
payee in fact receives the funds represented by the improperly paid
item. 128 Moreover, the court's decision that the check was not prop-
erly payable assumes that there was payment. The transaction might
be better characterized as an exchange, particularly since Chase took
the precaution of issuing its cashier's check in the name of the same
payee. 129 The court of appeals deftly avoided this characterization
122. 86 Misc. 2d at 681-82, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
123. U.C.C. § 3-419. See also J. WHITE & B. SUMMERS, supra note 92 § 15-4, at 499-501.
124. For a discussion of cases which support both an affirmative and negative answer, see J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 92, § 15-4, at 499-501.
125. Several other distinctions can be drawn between these cases. For example, in Hilsley,
neither the payee, who never saw the check, nor the drawer, who made the check payable
jointly to the payee and the forger, was negligent. See 24 A.D.2d at 29-30, 263 N.Y.S.2d at
579-80. The drawer in Tonelli, however, was negligent in its choice of Naiman as an agent. See
86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724. Totowa, as payee, was also arguably negligent or
worse when it accepted the proceeds of a check with knowledge that the funds it represented
did not belong to the presenter, Naiman. See id. at 683, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724-25.
Additionally, in Hillsley, a notation on the check indicated not only the general purpose
for which the check was issued, but also the specific person to whose credit the funds would go.
24 A.D.2d at 29, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 580. The "CD" on the Tonelli check only explained its
purpose. See 41 N.Y.S.2d at 668, 363 N.E.2d at 565, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 859. Although the payee
in Tonelli knew the source and purpose of the original check, 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d
at 724, the payee in Hillsley did not know the source of the funds. See 24 A.D.2d at 29, 263
N.Y.S.2d at 580.
Moreover, the Hillsley court rested its decision on the drawer's failure to show that the
payee had not been damaged by its action in exchanging the check. 24 A.D.2d at 30-31, 263
N.Y.S.2d at 581. Since the drawer's loss in Tonelli was probably not caused by Chase's failure to
use due care in exchanging the unindorsed certified check, see notes 60-63 supra, Hillsley was
in no way apposite.
126. 41 N.Y.2d at 668-69, 363 N.E.2d at 565-66, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 859-60.
127. Id. at 669, 363 N.E.2d at 566, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
128. See text accompanying note 174 infra.
129. See 86 Misc. 2d at 682, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 724. The transaction can be viewed in at least
three ways. The first is to suggest that it is the exchange of one obligation for another. This
would release the drawer from liability. Secondly, the transaction can be classified as a cancella-
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problem by asserting that the setting was analogous to a forged in-
dorsement case, 130 which it indeed may be. 131 The court dismissed
the estoppel theory by stating that "Totowa, the true payee, never
actually received the proceeds of the original certified check for the
purpose intended by the drawer."132 The court, however, com-
pletely ignored the fact that Totowa had knowledge of the source of
the funds.1 3 3  Finally, the Tonelli court ruled that the negligence of
the fund in entrusting the certified check to a dishonest agent was not
at issue since the check could only have been made properly payable
with an authorized indorsement.
134
The court of appeals was careful to emphasize that it reserved
the question of Chase's remedy against Totowa based on Totowa's
knowledge of the source of the cashier's check. 135 One must then
ask whether a bank which honors a check without a necessary in-
dorsement is liable to its customer. When the question is framed that
way the answer must be affirmative. In addition, it seems reasonable
as a matter of policy to place the loss on the bank since it arguably
has the last clear chance to avoid the loss and since it is in a financial
position to absorb or spread the loss.
In spite of those persuasive arguments, there are many objec-
tions to a holding that places loss on the negligent bank as opposed to
the negligent drawer. First, the law is not as clear as it may first
appear to be.' 3 6  Second, a court should not ignore a factual setting
in order to make a policy determination. Finally, cases like Tonelli
tend to assume a large place in the area of commercial paper. The
Tonelli decision could be cited as support for a broad rule of law that
it is 'per se negligent to make any payment or exchange of checks
without indorsement. When a bank does so, there can be no hope of
tion of the certification. This would clearly render Chase liable for conversion, since it would
amount to cancelling its acceptance of the certified check, crediting the fund's account, and then
redebiting the account. The brief for the bank indicates that this procedure was not followed.
Brief for Appellant at 4. Finally, the transaction can be characterized, as the court viewed it, as
a payment by Chase to Naiman and the subsequent acquisition by Naiman of a cashier's check
naming him as remitter. While such a characterization is theoretically possible, it ignores the
reality of what occurred.
130. 41 N.Y.2d at 670, 363 N.E.2d at 567, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 860.
131. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
132. 41 N.Y.2d at 670-71, 363 N.E.2d at 567, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
133. Id. at 671, 363 N.E.2d at 567, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
134. Id. at 671-72, 363 N.E.2d at 567-68, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62.
135. Id. at 672-73, 363 N.E.2d at 568, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
136. See text accompanying notes 203-09 infra. It is sufficient to note that prior to Tonelli, a
lower New York court ruled that a certified check did not require an indorsement to create a
right of payment in the taker. Sweedler v. Oboler, 65 Misc. 2d 789, 790, 319 N.Y. S.2d 89, 91
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 37 A.D.2d 1049, 325 NY.S.2d 966 (1971). Although Sweedler was cited
in the brief of the appellant, it was ignored by the court of appeals. Brief for Appellant at 9.
1978-1979]
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recovery since no defense will be available. Presumably, even au-
thorized agents could not bind their principals in similar cases, absent
ratification thereafter, because of the bank's negligence. Tonelli could
also be subjected to a narrow interpretation by limiting its holding to
the facts of the case.
1 3 7
The Tonelli decision is unfortunate because there is little, if any-
thing, that the bank could have done to avoid losing the money rep-
resented by the certified check, while the drawer could have pre-
vented the loss. Nevertheless, not only does the initial burden fall on
the bank, but it also falls without the benefit of any defenses. Addi-
tionally, the decision creates problems from the perspective of finds
redirection. Although Tonelli can be distinguished, it is certain to be
asserted as the leading decision rendering the taker of an unindorsed
certified check without right or remedy, even though the funds are
properly applied thereafter. If that assertion is accepted, it follows
that funds redirection can never occur without an indorsement or
other writing. Though the Tonelli case is not specificially a funds re-
direction case since any redirection was improper, its rule, if broadly
applied, would affect funds redirection, particularly in the realm of
certified checks. It is submitted that this rule should not be broadly
applied.
IV. CERTIFICATION AND FUNDS REDIRECTION
A. Introduction
Suppose that D draws a check payable to the order of P, and
then procures the check's certification, only to determine thereafter
that he wants an alternative payee, AP, to receive the money. As has
been indicated, there are several methods by which funds redirection
can be accomplished successfully in the absence of certification.
138
The question then becomes whether certification adds or subtracts
any necessary steps from the process.
Initially, it is clear that the certifying bank has some interest in
the item, since both that bank and the drawer are liable on the in-
strument. 139 The bank's interest however, should not extend beyond
determining that the check has been paid according to the drawer's
intent and up to the limits of the certified amount. Secondly, it
should be noted that the bank is under no obligation to certify a
137. To keep this analysis in perspective and to rebut such an effect, see U.C.C. § 3-202.
138. See notes 15-33 and accompanying text supra.
139. See U.C.C. § 3-411(1).
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check. 140  Where it does certify a check, the bank is afforded protec-
tion both by its internal procedures and by the law. 141
These two factors suggest that the rules governing the drawer's
ability to redirect funds represented by a certified check should differ
slightly, if at all, from those governing uncertified checks. As far as
can be determined, that suggestion has in fact been followed. Certifi-
cation modifies an informal means of redirection and subtracts a un-
ilateral formal method. The drawer can request that the certifying
bank withdraw its certification, and if it does so, he can then destroy
the check, write another, and have it certified. The only real differ-
ence between this and the act of the drawer in voiding or destroying
an uncertified check is that the bank has an interest in ensuring that
the check is voided before it will recredit the drawer's account.
Likewise, the drawer alone cannot stop payment since the obligation
on the certified check is not solely his. Thus while the act of certifica-
tion modifies the cancellation and reissue method of redirection, it
eliminates the most frequently used mode of unilateral funds redirec-
tion, the stop payment order. 142
There may, however, be times when the drawer of a check
which has been certified at his request is unwilling to have that cer-
tification cancelled. The certification may be valuable and difficult to
obtain.' 43  If the certification, once withdrawn, might not be reis-
sued, the drawer might desire to redirect the funds without formal
means. To the extent that he can do so without changing the check in
a way that is conspicuous, such as by adding alternative payees or
bearer words, the certifying bank will undoubtedly have to pay. The
bank in turn will be able to prevail in any suit brought by the drawer
whose intent has been effectuated. To the extent that the redirection
is done less skillfilly, the results should nevertheless be the same.
The remainder of this article will deal with these less sophisticated
methods of redirection. The primary focus will be on implied funds
redirection, where the drawer attempts to redirect a certified check
merely by indorsing it without changing the payee. The concept of
certification will be explored first, followed by an analysis of the redi-
rection problem.
140. Id. § 3-411(2).
141. See text accompanying notes 144 & 156-58 infra.
142. See U.C.C. §§ 4-303(1)(a), 4-403(1).
143. The drawer may be insolvent, rapidly approaching insolvency, or may have so many
creditors that he fears they will garnish his bank account when it is recredited. Perhaps his
nemesis is the certifying bank itself as it might be concerned that the customer is in default on
other obligations and would like to cancel the certification, recredit the customer's account, and
then exercise a right of set-off.
1978-1979]
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B. Certification
When a check is certified, the bank customarily debits the
drawer's account immediately to ensure that upon, presentment by a
payee or holder it will have the funds to pay what is now its obliga-
tion.' 44  It is often said that the drawer no longer has control over
the funds represented by the certified check. 145 This statement is
true only to the extent that it means that third parties, such as cred-
itors of the drawer, cannot reach the sum represented by the check
or that the drawer cannot unilaterally countermand payment after de-
livery of the check. 146 A broad assertion that a drawer loses all con-
trol over the certified check is misleading, as is the statement that a
certifying bank is absolutely liable on its certification, since the
drawer and the certifying bank may in fact agree to cancel the certifi-
cation. 147 In addition, a bank may unilaterally effect cancellation
before the check comes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value. 148
If the drawer had no control over the sums represented by the
certified check, lost certified checks would forever be beyond the
144. See Franklin Trust Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 111 Pa. Super. Ct. 58, 62, 169 A. 452,
453-54 (1933). See also G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 113 (5th ed. rev.
1949); 5B MICHIE, supra note 76, § 256(b), at 21-22.
145. See H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 7.6, at 154. One commentator has stated:
Certification operates as a setting aside from the account of the drawer of funds
sufficient to pay the check. When a check is certified, the drawer immediately loses
control of so much of his funds as are necessary to pay the check. 'A creditor of the drawer
who is unable to obtain custody of the check may not reach the funds so set aside or
prevent the bank paying the check.
Id. at 154-55 (footnote omitted). The reason for this rule is that the obligation to pay the check
is now the certifying bank's as well as the drawer's, and in order to protect the certifying bank
from liability, other persons are said no longer to have an interest. See id. at 155.
146. See Feingold v. Ornoff, 57 N.Y.S.2d 68, 69-70 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. 1945); Standard Fac-
tors Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 182 Misc. 701, 706, 50 N.Y.S.2d 10, 14 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
aff'd mer., 269 A.D. 658, 53 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1945). The Uniform Commercial Code provides
that a stop payment order is too late if an item has already been certified. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(a),
Comment 5. See Jefferies & Co. v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206, 1216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Lincoln Sec. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., [1971] 8 U.C.C. REP. SEAV. (CALLAGHAN), 215, 216
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 8, 1970); Maintenance Serv. Inc. v. Royal Nat'l Bank, [1968] 4 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. (CALLAGHAN), 766, 766 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 31, 1967).
147. See Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1938); Umbsen
v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 33 Cal. 2d 599, 602, 203 P.2d 752, 754 (1949); Buehler v. Galt, 35
Ill. App. 225, 230 (1889); In re Williamson, 264 A.D. 615, 616, 35 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1018 (1942).
See also Weck v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 557, 563, aff'd per curiam,
202 Pa. Super. Ct. 39, 195 A.2d Ill'(1963)(bank breached no duty to drawer when it certified
check because of a mistake and then cancelled certification and destroyed check upon discovery
of the mistake).
148. Rockland Trust Co. v. South Shore Nat'l Bank, 366 Mass. 74, 79, 314 N.E.2d 438, 441
(1974); Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406, 410, 345 N.Y.S.2d 263,
268 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd mem., 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973). See 5B MICHIE,
supra note 76, § 256, at 21-22; H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 7.15, at 164-65.
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reach of their true owner, 149 payees would have a cause of action
against the certifying bank immediately upon certification,15 0 and the
certification would immediately and forever bind the bank to pay
checks even though certification was procured through fraud and the
fraudulent party still had possession. The proper rule must be that
since the obligation to pay the certified check is now shared by the
certifying bank, the drawer cannot take any unilateral action that will
operate to the detriment of the bank, such as stop payment on the
check or otherwise countermand it.151  Moreover, to the extent that
the drawer has parted with the check, he can no longer affect the
payment of the instrument.
To illustrate the unreasonableness of the statement that the
drawer loses control over the funds, one need only ask to whom the
funds represented by a certified check belong prior to delivery. There
are three possibilities: the drawer, the bank which accepted the check
by certifying it, and the payee. Cases indicate that the ownership of
the funds represented by a certified check depends upon who is
claiming the funds. 152  If a third party creditor claims the funds,
courts hold that the drawer does not own them. 153 The rule is the
same under section 4-303(1)(a) of the Code. 154  Were it otherwise,
the bank would run the risk of double liability, to the drawer upon
certification and to the creditor. It is equally clear, however, that the
149. If that were the case, the drawer could not maintain an action under U.C.C. § 3-804 to
recover on the instrument because such remedy is available only to the owner. Id. If the
drawer is deemed to have no ownership interest in the instrument after certification, the rem-
edy would not be available to him and the instrument and its proceeds would be lost to him
forever.
150. See generally Umbsen v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 33 Cal. 2d 599, 601-02, 203 P.2d
752, 754 (1949); In re Williamson, 264 A.D. 615, 616, 35 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1018 (1942).
151. See note 146 supra.
152. See notes 153-58 and accompanying text infra.
153. See Mclntire v. Baskin, 173 Ga. 746, 749-50, 161 S.E. 363, 365 (1931); Standard Factors
Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 182 Misc. 701, 707, 50 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
aff'd mem., 269 A.D. 658, 53 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1945). For example, the Standard Factors court
held that the creditor could attach the certified check only by serving a warrant upon the holder
of the instrument. 182 Misc. at 707, 50 N.Y.S.2d at 14. The court stated that "upon the certifi-
cation of the check, eo instante, the sum appropriated from the credit of the drawer thereupon
stood as a sum to the credit of the certified check," and no longer to the drawer's credit. Id.
154. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(a). This section states:
Any knowledge, notice or stop-order received by, legal process served upon or setoff
exercised by a payor bank, whether or not effective under other rules of law to terminate,
suspend or modify the bank's right or duty to pay an item or to charge its customer's
account for the item, comes too late to so terminate, suspend or modify such right or duty
if the knowledge, notice, stop-order or legal process is received or served and a reason-
able time for the bank to act thereon expires or the setoff is exercised after the bank has
done any of the following:
(a) accepted or certified the item ....
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payee of a certified check does not own the funds, at least prior to
delivery of the check: 155 "Where the drawer has a check certified,
the payee acquires no rights against the certifying bank unless and
until the check has been delivered." 156
It should also be clear that the certifying bank's only interest in
the fund is in ensuring that its liability does not extend beyond the
sum debited to the drawer's account. 157 If the certifying bank's lia-
bility is not thus limited, the payee would have a vested claim against
the drawee from the moment of certification and the payee would
effectively become an irrevocable assignee of the drawer. Although
courts hold that the funds are beyond the reach of the drawer in
order to protect the certifying bank, it is clear that the drawer has
ownership rights superior to those of the payee or the certifying
bank, as long as he does not exercise them to the prejudice of the
certifying bank.
158
C. Certification, Delivery, and Funds Redirection
The problem in the area of finds redirection caused by certifica-
tion may be illustrated by the following hypothetical: Assume that D
draws and has certified a check payable to P, but now wants to redi-
rect the funds to AP. Assume further that he does so through implied
funds redirection by indorsing the check in his (D's) own name. AP
brings the check to his bank (Bank-2), which takes it in good faith for
value without checking it too carefully. When the check is presented
by Bank-2, payment is refused because the check is missing a proper
indorsement or looks as if it may have been altered. Bank-2 can go
back to AP, who can go back to D, who can rectify the matter in
several ways. If something intervenes which makes such tracing im-
possible, such as D's insolvency or the certifying bank's unwillingness
to honor its acceptance, AP and/or Bank-2 should be able to enforce
the check as certified against the certifying bank. If Bank-2 can estab-
lish that D had control over the instrument and ownership rights in it
155. Umbsen v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 33 Cal. 2d 599, 601-02, 203 P.2d 752, 754 (1949);
In re Williamson, 264 A.D. 615, 616, 35 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1018 (1942).
156. H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 7.6, at 156 (footnote omitted).
157. See Umbsen v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 33 Cal. 2d 599, 601, 203 P.2d 752, 754 (1949);
Sweedler v. Oboler, 65 Misc. 2d 789, 790, 319 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91-92 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 37
A.D.2d 1049, 325 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1971).
158. See Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F.2d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1938); Umbsen
v. Crocker First Nat'l Bank, 33 Cal. 2d 599, 601, 203 P.2d 752, 754 (1949); Maurice Abrams &
Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 31 La. Ann. 61, 62 (1879); In re Williamson, 264 A.D. 615, 616, 35
N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1018 (1942). See also 5B MICHIE, supra note 76, § 256(b), at 21-22.
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at the time of the implied funds redirection to AP, then Bank-2
should prevail over the certifying bank. The extent of control over the
instrument maintained by the drawer depends upon whether the
check was ever delivered and whether, absent delivery to the named
payee, the drawer has acted so as not to prejudice the certifying
bank. 159
When the drawer of a check has possession of it, a presumption
arises that it has not been delivered to the payee. 160 That proposi-
tion, of ancient origin, has been reiterated by the Illinois Supreme
Court as recently as 1974 in Gillespie v. Riley Management Corp. 161
In that case, the court likened a cashier's check to a certified check
and stated that "the purchaser of a cashier's check [like the drawer of
a certified check] remains the 'owner' thereof until such time as he
delivers or negotiates it to the payee." 162 This proposition was pre-
viously recognized in the context of a certified check in Umbsen v.
Crocker First National Bank. 163 The California Supreme Court in
Umbsen was confronted with a check that had been certified in 1905
and had never been presented. 164 The state claimed the proceeds as
abandoned property, but the plaintiff, a successor to the last known
owner, claimed that his right to the proceeds was superior to that of
the bank or the state. 165  The court considered whether the check
had ever been delivered and determined that
[t]he transfer [of the drawer's funds] occurs at the time of certifica-
tion, if the check is certified at the instance of the payee to whom
the check has been delivered. If certification is procured at the
instance of the drawer, however, the transfer does not occur until
the check is delivered to the payee .... 166
The Umbsen court also addressed the drawer's right to have the pro-
ceeds of the check recredited to his account before delivery. 167 In
ruling that the plaintiff successor could recover, the court noted that
159. See text accompanying notes 145-58 supra.
160. Buehler v. Gait, 35 I11. App. 225, 230 (1899); 5B MICHIE, supra note 76, § 256, at 32;
H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 7.15, at 165.
161. 59 I11. 2d 211, 319 N.E.2d 753 (1974). See also Bunge Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 37 A.D.2d 409, 414, 325 N.Y.S.2d 983, 988 (1971), aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 223, 286
N.E.2d 903, 335 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1972).
162. 59 II1. 2d at 217, 319 N.E.2d at 757.
163. 33 Cal. 2d 599, 203 P.2d 752 (1949).
164. Id. at 600, 203 P.2d at 753.
165. Id. at 601, 203 P.2d at 753.
166. Id. at 601-02, 203 P.2d at 754 (citations omitted). The result should be the same under
the Code. See U.C.C. § 3-411.
167. 33 Cal. 2d at 602, 203 P.2d at 754.
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just as there exists a presumption of delivery when one is in posses-
sion of an instrument, there is also a presumption against delivery
when an instrument has not been presented.
16
It should therefore be clear that as between the drawer, the
payee, and the certifying bank, the operative question is whether the
drawer has delivered the check to the payee. If he has, the payee
then has immediate rights in the instrument; if he has not, then the
payee has no claim to the instrument. The extent to which this prop-
osition has been applied is demonstrated by the early Missouri case of
Bathgate v. Exchange Bank, 16 9 where the court held that a certifying
bank was not obligated to pay a check certified at the drawer's re-
quest when the check was delivered to the payee without the consent
of the drawer. 170 Until there is delivery to the payee with the
drawer's consent, the payee has no right to the check, and the drawer
may control it and engage in finds redirection notwithstanding its
certification.
If there has been no delivery to the named payee, the question
of who owned and controlled the check is narrowed to either the
drawer or the certifying bank. Since the funds represented by the
certified check have been debited to the drawer's account, the sole
interest of the certifying drawee bank is in ensuring that it will only
have to pay the funds once. The certifying bank is not concerned with
to whom it pays the funds, so long as the payment will not prejudice
its future rights or liabilities with respect to the instrument itself.17 1
The question thus becomes whether the drawer, by his actions, has
prejudiced the certifying bank. If he has not, and if the certifying
bank's liability will be extinguished by making payment to a sub-
sequent nonpayee taker, including a negligent collecting bank, then
the certifying bank should be compelled to pay the drawer's alterna-
tive payee and/or Bank-2.
A certified check involves two contractual obligations on the part
of the certifying bank. The first, which is the same contract that the
bank makes with all of its checking account depositors, is that it will
pay the check properly, according to the order of the drawer.172 The
168. Id. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
169. 199 Mo. App. 583, 205 S.W. 875 (1918).
170. Id. at 587-88, 205 S.W. at 877. Provided that the payee is not a holder in due course
protected by U.C.C. § 3-305, the result under the Code should be the same. Id. § 3-306.
171. This assumes that the certifying bank does not intend to exercise any available right of
set-off. To the extent that any prejudice arises from the act of the certifying bank in the first
instance, it does not seem too unfair to leave the bank on a par with all other creditors.
172. See U.C.C. § 4-401.
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second is unique to certified checks, since the contractual obligation
of payment, by the act of certification, runs to holders or assignees of
the check. 1 73 Since the payee has no interest in the certified check
before delivery and a collecting bank or other subsequent holder is
the holder or assignee of the check, the certifying bank can refuse
payment only if it is improper as against the drawer. Where the
drawer intends that AP and/or Bank-2, and not the named payee, be
paid, one must ask if the certifying bank can pay according to that
intent and avoid further liability. A bank which pays according to the
intent of its customer may in fact do so without fear of liability to the
customer, for, as one commentator has stated, "[i]f the depositor has
lost nothing he should recover nothing; a bank being liable to its
depositor only for the damages sustained by him by reason of its
paying a check upon a forged indorsement."17
4
This principle is even more appropriate in the implied funds re-
direction case since the indorsement is not forged, but is that of the
drawer himself. The drawer cannot later claim that he has been dam-
aged since it is his signature, and he would therefore have no cause
of action against the certifying bank for improperly paying the in-
strument. In that situation, the certifying bank should not be able to
refuse payment.
As indicated in Tonelli, the general rule is that a bank may
charge its customer's account only for items properly payable. 175 Or-
dinarily, only the named payee's genuine indorsement will make the
instrument properly payable, since usually that is the drawer's intent,
and an unauthorized signature cannot operate to defeat that in-
tent. 176 If it is the intent of the drawer that the payee's indorsement
is not required, however, then a bank which pays without the in-
dorsement or on a forged indorsement will not be liable to the
drawer for the payment:
Where the circumstances are such as to amount to a direction
from the drawer to the bank to pay without reference to the
genuineness of indorsements, or are equivalent to a subsequent
admission that the indorsement is genuine, in reliance upon which
the bank is induced to alter its position, the bank will not be
chargeable with the lOSS. 1
7 7
173. Under U.C.C. § 3-411(1), certification is acceptance. Id. The certifying bank becomes
the acceptor and, as such, engages to pay the instrument under U.C.C. § 3-413, which sets
forth the contract of an acceptor. Id.
174. 5B MICHIE, supra note 76, § 277(a), at 89.
175. 41 N.Y.2d at 669, 363 N.E.2d at 566, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 860, construing U.C.C. § 4-401.
176. U.C.C. § 3-404.
177. 5B MICHIE, supra note 76, § 281, at 137-38.
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To summarize, where the drawer has indicated his intent to pay
without the payee's indorsement, a bank which pays will not be liable
to the drawer. Since the certifying bank's sole interest is whether it
can safely pay the check, the fact that the drawer could not assert
improper payment is dispositive. Also, where the drawer has indi-
cated his intent to pay without the payee's indorsement, he will be
estopped from asserting improper payment. 178 Such an estoppel op-
erates to protect all parties, 179 including the drawee bank which ordi-
narily bears the risk of improper payment. 180 If the drawer's intent
is effectuated by the authorization of payment, he is not harmed and
thus the drawee bank cannot be liable for improper payment.' 8 '
D. The Power to Redirect Funds
The only possible claimants to the funds are the payee, the cer-
tifying bank, the alternative payee, and the drawer. If, as has been
demonstrated, the payee has no interest, 182 and the drawer-owner's
intent is effectuated so that he cannot hold the certifying bank liable
for improper payment, 183 the only remaining question is whether the
drawer-owner has the power to implement his intent by indorsing a
certified check and thereafter renegotiating it. No cases have directly
decided whether the drawer has the power of implied funds redirec-
tion. Had the drawer inserted his name as alternative payee, and
then indorsed it, Bank-2 would have, however, received payment
from the certifying bank:
[I]t has been held that where the drawer of a check payable to a
certain person or order has the same certified by the bank on
which it is drawn, he may, at any time before any third person
acquires a right in such check, alter it, making it payable to bearer;
and, when so changed, the bank, by paying it to bearer, will be
178. 5A id., § 181, at 487-88. "But the drawer of a check authorizing payment without the
payee's indorsement is estopped from contending that the drawee was liable for payment with-
out such indorsement." Id.
179. The Court of Appeals of New York in Tonelli dismissed the estoppel argument by citing
Hillsley as authority for the proposition that the payee who unwittingly receives funds of the
drawer in payment for a different debt has not received the proceeds of the check. See 41
N.Y.2d at 671, 363 N.E.2d at 567, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 861. For a discussion of Tonelli and Hillsley,
see notes 104-25 and accompanying text supra.
180. See U.C.C. § 4-402.
181. See Gordon v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 361 Mass. 258, 280 N.E.2d 152 (1972). The
Gordon court stated that "[t]he drawer is not harmed if the drawee bank's action with respect to
a check carries out . . . the drawer's purpose with respect to that check." Id. at 260, 280
N.E.2d at 154.
182. See text accompanying notes 155-58, 169 & 170 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 174-77 supra.
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protected against any claim of the payee first named, or the claim
of any person through any private agreement with the drawer, of
which the bank had no notice.
184
The foregoing rule that the drawer may alter the name of the payee is
based upon the case of Maurice Abrams & Co. v. Union National
Bank. 185 In that case, the court held that the bank was not liable for
paying the check to the "altered" payee, stating:
There is no intimation that . . . [the payee] ever knew or assented
to the certification of the check in his favor, or ever held it for a
moment .... On the contrary, the allegation is that . . . [the
drawers], who held the check when certified, themselves altered it
before parting with it. What right had the Bank to object to the
change, when made by the drawer before any third person had
acquired any rights in or under the check? ... If I draw my check
on the Bank to the order of another, and myself procure its certifi-
cation, until I part with the check, or, certainly, until the payee
has consented to accept the stipulation in his favor, I may with-
draw it, and the Bank could not refuse to cancel or redeem the
check in my hands. 186
It should thus be clear that if the drawer had inserted the words "or
bearer" or had inserted his name and then indorsed the check,
Bank-2 could recover on the instrument.
The question therefore becomes whether, despite this omission
of alternative words, the drawer's intent as manifested by his in-
dorsement ought to be followed or whether the certifying bank
should be allowed to thwart that clearly manifested intent. If the
drawer's intent as the owner of an instrument until delivery is not
given primary effect, it must be because the certifying bank has an
interest in seeing that only the named payee is paid. It has long been
held that the intent of the drawer or owner of a cashier's check
should be given effect over the intent of the issuer, 187 since the
purchaser should control to whom payment is made. One court has
explained that "the rationale of the rule . . . [is] that an issuing bank
• . . has no personal interest in the person or entity named as
payee." 188 The same reasoning should apply to the drawer of a cer-
tified check.
184. 5B MICHIE, supra note 61, § 256(b), at 22 (footnotes omitted).
185. 31 La. Ann. 61 (1879).
186. Id. at 62 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
187. See Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 8 Cal. 2d 303, 309, 65 P.2d
355, 358 (1937).
188. United States Nat'l Bank v. Bank of America, 264 Cal. App. 2d 871, 873, 71 Cal. Rptr.
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This right of the purchaser of a cashier's check and of the drawer
of a certified check to control to whom the funds are paid is a right
incident to ownership. While the two species of checks differ, 189 the
rights respecting them should not. As the California Court of Appeals
stated in Burke v. Mission Bay Yacht Sales: 190
Even though the plaintiff was not actually the drawer of the instant
cashier's check, her rights in the premises simulated those of the
drawer of an ordinary check .... For the purpose at hand, there is
no legally significant distinction between such a situation and that
which would have existed if she had deposited $10,000 with the
bank and requested its certification of her check payable to that
defendant. In the latter instance the payee's right to have the
$10,000 would not have come into being until the check had been
delivered, and in the meantime the plaintiff would have had the
right to cause it to be cancelled and her account recredited with
the amount thereof.... The check was the property of the plain-
tiff until delivery. 191
It is thus apparent that the drawer has the right to alter the name of
the payee before delivery.
It is clear that the drawer's intent, as manifested by his indorse-
ment, is to redirect the sums represented by the check as if he had
altered the instrument to name either himself or bearer as alternative
payee. Had he actually altered the check, he could have negotiated
the instrument by indorsing it, since an instrument payable to the
order of two or more persons in the alternative may be negotiated by
any of them who has possession. 192 The fact that the drawer failed to
insert his name as alternative payee should not change this result.
Where the intent to change the payee is clear from the instrument
and the facts, it should be given effect.
The question becomes whether the certifying bank in the
hypothetical has been so prejudiced by the attempted funds redirec-
tion by altering the payee's name that it should be discharged from
its undertaking. Under section 3-407(2)(a) of the Code,1 93 an altera-
tion, such as the addition of a party payee, may operate to discharge
a nonconsenting party to the instrument only if the alteration is: 1)
made by the holder; 2) material; and 3) fraudulent. 194  Without a
189. See notes 6, 7 & 10 supra.
190. 214 Cal. App. 2d 723, 29 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1963).
191. Id. at 732, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 690 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
192. U.C.C. § 3-116(a).
193. Id. § 3-407(2)(a).
194. Id.
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showing that the drawer acted fraudulently, there can be no dis-
charge of the party who certified the check.195 Also, it is the drawer
and not a holder of the check who has altered the instrument. Section
3-407 further provides that in order to discharge the party defending
on the grounds of alteration, that alteration must change his con-
tract. 196 Although the addition of a payee would ordinarily change
contract liability, here, where the certifying bank's only liability is to
pay the instrument to the holder or assignee, the contract liability
remains unchanged. According to section 3-407(a)(b) of the Code,
197
"no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument may be
enforced according to its original tenor, or as to incomplete instru-
ments according to the authority given."198 Since the instrument
has been altered neither fraudulently nor by a holder, it can be en-
forced according to its original tenor. Although it could be argued
that tenor encompasses more than merely the amount, it should not
be so interpreted when to do so would prejudice the good faith
purchaser. 99 Moreover, it might be argued that the drawer has
treated the instrument as if it were incomplete since the payee's
name has been changed. The instrument should therefore be en-
forced as completed with the payee's name changed, according to the
authority of the drawer, as manifested by his indorsement.2 °°
Given that the drawer could have altered the check without dis-
charging the certifying bank, and Bank-2 could thereafter have en-
forced the check, the question becomes whether the certifying bank
should be allowed to refuse payment when the redirection is ac-
complished by implied means.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id. § 3-407(2)(b).
198. Id.
199. The question whether tenor encompasses more than mere payment is answered both
affirmatively and negatively. Standing alone, the word tenor probably means nothing more than
exact copy. By that interpretation, the altered instrument could be enforced according to an
exact copy of the original. Such a reading of the word is probably too broad. A more exacting
definition, focusing on time, place, and manner of payment, can be found in C. NORTON, BILLS
AND NOTES § 43, at 121 (4th ed. 1914) which states: "THE TENOR OF THE BILL-Is the
request in the bill to pay the money at the time and place and in the manner mentioned in it."
Id. This definition places the emphasis on the instrument as a payment device, and although it
requires exactitude with respect to time, place, and manner, the primary focus seems to be on
amount. Although little pre-Code and no post-Code case law interpretations exist, it is probable
that tenor as used in the Code refers to amount, time, place, and manner. Tenor ought to
include the original payee in the ordinary certified check case, although this would depend on a
finding that manner includes the payee, which may be questionable. In any event, the admis-
sion of parol evidence would be required and thus summary judgment, which was granted in
Tonelli, would be precluded. See 86 Misc. 2d at 685, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
200. See U.C.C. § 3-115.
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Ordinarily, as the basis of the Toneli rule postulates, the cer-
tifying bank is obligated to pay on its certification only when the
check is properly indorsed at presentment. 201 As has been shown,
however, if the drawer indicates that proper indorsement is not
necessary, the bank will not be liable for paying an improperly in-
dorsed check. 20 2 One must thus inquire whether the certifying bank
can refuse to pay the check, insisting upon the formality of Bank-2
returning the check to AP, who will return it to the drawer for the
purpose of inserting his name as payee, and presenting it again before
enforcing Bank-2's rights against the certifying bank. This insistence
may cause great hardship to AP and/or Bank-2. The certifying bank
may assert that certification had been withdrawn before AP or Bank-2
became entitled to the proceeds of the check. AP or Bank-2, who
both gave the drawer value and took the instrument in good faith,
would not be able to recoup the sums expended in reliance upon the
drawer's representations and the certifying bank's certification.
For reasons of policy and practicality, it would be more appro-
priate to adopt the reasoning of the New York Supreme Court in
Sweedler v. Oboler.20 3  In Sweedler, the defendant bank had issued
a cashier's check to and had certified personal checks of a third
party. 20 4 The third party purchased goods from the plaintiff, paying
for them with these checks. 205 The plaintiff later discovered that the
checks had not been indorsed by the payee, who subsequently re-
fused to indorse them. 20 6  Since the checks were not indorsed, the
certifying bank refused to pay, asserting that there was no presump-
tion of ownership. 20 7 The court disagreed and held that the plaintiff
was entitled to be paid, 208 stating:
The law regards that as done which ought to have been done.
There can be no doubt that it was intended that the purchaser
indorse the checks given in payment for the merchandise which he
took into his possession .... The failure to so indorse was either
the result of a mutual mistake or mistake on plaintiff's part and
fraud on the purchaser's part. Whichever it is, the purchaser has
obtained merchandise without paying for it ....
201. See 41 N.Y.2d at 669, 363 N.E.2d at 565-66, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 859-60. See text accom-
panying note 127 supra. See also H. BAILEY, supra note 6, § 7.14, at 164.
202. Dawson v. National Bank, 197 N.C. 499, 501, 150 S.E. 38, 39 (1929). See text accom-
panying notes 184-86 supra.
203. 65 Misc. 2d 789, 319 N.Y.S.2d 89 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 37 A.D.2d 1049, 325
N.Y.S.2d 996 (1971).
204. 65 Misc. 2d at 789, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 789-90, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
207. Id. at 790, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
208. Id., 319 N.Y.S.2d at 92.
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The issuance of a certified or cashier's check by a bank simply
means the setting aside of funds to meet payment thereof. The
bank, of course, has no interest therein, so long as its depositor
cannot hold it liable for releasing such finds in payment of a cer-
tified or cashier's check.
A determination by the court that plaintiff is entitled under
these circumstances to payment of the certified checks and
cashier's check will relieve defendant bank of any responsibility in
making such payment and avoid any possibility of liability to its
depositor. 209
The only material distinction between the Sweedler case and the
hypothetical is that the drawer in Sweedler was originally the
payee, 210 whereas in the hypothetical the drawer was not the payee.
It is submitted that this difference is irrelevant. Where, as in the
hypothetical, AP and Bank-2 part with value in reliance on the rep-
resentation of the drawer, the certifying bank's only interest in the
check is its own liability. The drawer intended to vest ownership in
AP and thereafter in Bank-2, as evidenced by the apparently improper
indorsement. That intent, implied by the attempted funds redi-
rection, should be implemented without regard to the formality of the
instrument itself.
V. POST FUNDS REDIRECTION STATUS
A. Introduction
Assuming that implied funds redirection has taken place, and
that a court analyzes the problem in the terms suggested above, it
will also be important to determine the status of the subsequent
takers, AP and Bank-2. They may be either holders, holders in due
course, or mere transferees.
B. Holder/Holder in Due Course
The threshold question is whether AP or Bank-2 can be holders
and subsequently holders in due course. To be a holder in due
course, one must come within the Code's definition of a holder as "a
person who is in possession of . . .an instrument .. .drawn, issued
or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank."'2 1 1 If D
had the right to alter the named payee, intended to do so, and effec-
209. id., 319 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92.
210. Id. at 789, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
211. U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
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tuated that intent by his indorsement, the AP and Bank-2 would be
holders. If AP and Bank-2 satisfy the requirements of section 3-302 of
the Code 2 12 by taking for value, in good faith, and without notice
that the instrument has been dishonored or is overdue, or of any
defense of claim, they would be holders in due course. 213  It is as-
sumed that AP and Bank-2 gave value 214 and took the instrument in
good faith.
2 15
Accepting the proposition that AP and/or Bank-2 became holders
by the drawer's indorsement, the only remaining question is whether
they had notice that the check was overdue or had been dishonored
or of any defense or claim to it on the part of any person. 216  As to
notice of claims, neither the original payee, the certifying bank, or
any third person had any right in the instrument at all.2 17  Assuming
that the impropriety of the indorsement cannot be raised by the
drawer, the only conceivable defense that could be asserted in the
hypothetical would be withdrawal of certification. In any event, such
a withdrawal would occur too late if the instrument had already come
into the hands of a third person, such as AP or Bank-2, regardless of
whether or not the third person is a holder. Although it might be
urged that the mere fact that the instrument appears to be altered
should give notice of possible defenses, this argument should be dis-
missed since the drawer is in possession of the instrument and the
taker is receiving it directly from D. While it may be argued that
ordinarily a taker with notice of one possible defense takes subject to
all defenses, the question here is whether it is more appropriate to
place a loss on one who has purchased in good faith, although with
possible notice, or on a bank which voluntarily certified an instru-
ment that led to a good faith purchase. It appears that the bank
212. id. § 3-302.
213. Id. Section 3-302(1) provides: "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instru-
ment (a) for value; and (b) in good faith; and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been
dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person." Id.
214. Section 3-303 of the Code, id. § 3-303, defines taking for value:
A holder takes the instrument for value (a) to the extent that the agreed consideration has
been performed or that he acquires a security interest in or a lien on the instrument
otherwise than by legal process; or (b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as
security for an antecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is due; or (c)
when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrevocable commitment to a
third person.
Id.
Section 3-201(3) of the Code, id. § 3-201(3) states that the transferee who gives value for an
instrument has the right to require the transferor to give him an indorsement. Id. It should be
noted that insistence on formal indorsement may not be sufficient in this case.
215. Good faith is defined in the Code as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." Id. § 1-201(19).
216. Sd. § 3-302().
217. See text accompanying notes 188-91 supra.
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should bear the loss, either because both are equally blameworthy or
equally blameless and the bank can best bear the loss. While AP
could have avoided the loss by using more caution, by hypothesis he
is not sophisticated. Even Bank-2, as a more sophisticated taker,
should not take subject to the certifying bank's rights since it takes
largely in reliance on the certification. 218  In addition, subsequent
takers do not have notice of dishonor since the instrument has not
been and may never be dishonored, despite the fact that the certify-
ing bank refuses to pay it when it is first presented.
219
The final requirement for holder in due course status is that the
holder must take the instrument without notice that it is overdue. 220
The Code provides that the ordinary check drawn and payable in the
United States is presumed to be overdue after thirty days. 2 2 ' The
certified check, however, "stands on a different footing from any or-
dinary check." 222 The only case which found a certified check over-
due involved a check which was presented almost twelve years after
issue. 223 It therefore seems clear that both AP and Bank-2 would be
without notice that the instrument was overdue. Consequently, they
would qualify as holders in due course.
The certifying bank undoubtedly would argue that AP and
Bank-2 cannot be holders by virtue of section 3-202 of the Code,
224
which provides that negotiation can only occur through the indorse-
ment of the instrument by or on behalf of the instrument's
holder. 225 Since the drawer was not a holder of the instrument, the
certifying bank would contend that the indorsement by him could not
qualify his transferee as a holder. This argument has traditionally
been used by courts to deny holder status to takers from thieves.
22 6
In the hypothetical, however, the drawer was not a thief but rather
the owner of the instrument. If the owner and holder are not identi-
cal, the owner should prevail and his intent should be determinative.
"No party can ever be a holder of an order instrument stolen prior to
indorsement by the owner of the instrument." 2 27 Since here the
218. To compare the rules regarding banks in the position of Bank-2 with respect to restric-
tive indorsements and notice, see U.C.C. § 3-206.
219. See text accompanying notes 251 & 252 infra.
220. U.C.C. § 3-302(1)(c).
221. Id. § 3-304(3)(c).
222. National Mechanics' Bank v. Schmelz Nat'l Bank, 136 Va. 33, 40, 116 S.E. 380, 382
(1923).
223. See Weaver v. Harrell, 115 W. Va. 409, 414, 176 S.E. 608, 610 (1934).
224. U.C.C. § 3-202.
225. Id.
226. See Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 345 Mass. 1, 6, 184
N.E.2d 358, 362 (1962).
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owner has indorsed the instrument, those takers who satisfy the re-
quirements of the Code 228 should be classified as holders or as holders
in due course.
This situation may be analogized to the fictitious payee or pad-
ded payroll cases addressed by section 3-405 of the Code,229 which
provides that an indorsement by any person in the name of the payee
is effective to constitute subsequent takers as holders and holders in
due course. 230  The intent of the drawer as to whether the named
payee or some other person should have an interest is crucial. Simi-
larly, the intent of the drawer in the hypothetical should control and
operate to vest in his transferee the rights of a holder in due
course. 231 Assuming that there are no deficiencies other than the
added payee or the drawer's indorsement on the instrument which
would yield notice, both AP and Bank-2 should be deemed holders in
due course, at least to the extent that they meet the requirements of
good faith and value.
C. Transferee
If AP and Bank-2 are not assumed to be holders, the result
should not change significantly. AP and Bank-2, under section 3-201
of the Code,2 3 2 would still have such rights as the transferor has in
the instrument.233 Since the drawer has been shown to be the
owner of the instrument, 234 AP and Bank-2 would thus acquire those
ownership rights. Even if AP and Bank-2 are deemed to take subject
to any claims or defenses, there are no claims or defenses available to
any party other than the possible right of the certifying bank to cancel
its certification.2 35 At this stage of analysis, it is enough to say that
neither AP's nor Bank-2's position is dependent upon a finding that
they are holders in due course.
228. See notes 211-23 and accompanying text supra.
229. U.C.C. § 3-405.
230. Id.
231. See Gordon v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 361 Mass. 258, 261, 260 N.E.2d 152, 154 (1972).
Discussing § 3-405, the court noted that the drawer in Gordon was not damaged because only
those persons who were intended by the drawer to take an interest received money from the
forgery. Id. at 261, 280 N.E.2d at 154.
232. U.C.C. § 3-201.
233. Section 3-201(1) provides:
(1) Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has
therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim against
it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due course.
Id. § 3-201(1).
234. See text accompanying notes 184-91 supra.
235. See notes 236-44 and accompanying text infra.
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VI. WITHDRAWAL OF CERTIFICATION
Irrespective of whether or not AP and Bank-2 qualify as holders
in due course, the law is clear that a certifying bank may not cancel
its certification after the instrument has come into the hands of a
bona fide purchaser for value.
236
A certifying bank may generally cancel or withdraw its certifica-
tion under the following circumstances: 1) where it has certified the
instrument by mistake; 2) where it has been induced by the de-
positor's fraud, as where the depositor induces the bank to certify a
check in excess of his balance; 3) where it conditionally certifies an
unindorsed check which is not later indorsed; 4) where the drawer
still has possession of the check; or 5) where there is proof that the
instrument has been lost.2 37 Except where the instrument has been
lost, the bank's certification may be withdrawn only if the rights of
third parties have not intervened. 238 As soon as the certified check
is transferred to a third person, the certifying bank's right to with-
draw or cancel the certification terminates regardless of whether it
knew of the transfer,2 39 thus making the time of the transfer crucial.
Withdrawal in the hypothesized setting will most likely occur after
the certifying bank learns that the original payee has not received the
proceeds of the check. At that point, when the check is presented
without the original payee's indorsement, the certifying bank may at-
tempt to cancel the certification. By that time, however, it will be
cognizant of AP's and/or Bank-2's interest and will not be able to
withdraw certification.
24 0
The certifying bank ought to at least be estopped from asserting
its right to cancel the certification after acquiring knowledge of AP's
236. See National Bank of Commerce v. Baltimore Commercial Bank, 141 Md. 554, 556, 118
A. 855, 855-56 (1922); Balducci v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 74 Misc. 2d 406, 410, 345
N.Y.S.2d 263, 268 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd mem., 41 A.D.2d 1030, 344 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1973).
Under the Code, the bank's acceptance in the form of certification is final in favor of a holder in
due course. U.C.C. § 3-418. Whether the drafters of the Code intended to treat good faith
reliance on acceptance differently from good faith reliance on payment is unclear. Section 3-418,
dealing with finality of payment or acceptance, after stating that payment or acceptance is final
in favor of the holder in due course, concludes that it is also final in favor of "a person who has
in good faith changed his position in reliance on the payment." Id. (emphasis added). This
clause was added to the 1957 version of the Code "to make clear the continued application
where appropriate of a general principle of law." [1978] 6 BENDERS U.C.C. SERV. § 3-418, at
1-282 (1965). It thus appears that it was not the drafters' intent to treat persons relying on
acceptance less advantageously than those relying on payment. Therefore, the person in the
position of AP or Bank-2 who relies in good faith on the certification ought to be able to assert
its finality, even though certification is not payment.
237. See H. BAILEY, supra note 6, §§ 7.9-15, at 158-65.
238. See id. § 7.9, at 158; id. § 7.10, at 160-61.
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and Bank-2's interest. 241 This is clearly an appropriate situation for
an estoppel, since the certifying bank has acted in such a fashion as to
lead subsequent persons to take the instrument in reliance on the
certification. 242  By its certification, the bank indicated to all that it
was primarily liable to pay the instrument. 243 The certification was
expected to influence third persons to accept the instrument, and it
probably would influence AP and Bank-2, particularly since the check
lacks a payee's indorsement. Finally, AP and Bank-2 have no way of
knowing that the certifying bank desires to cancel its certification, and
this desire is not likely to be manifested until after the check is pre-
sented by Bank-2. AP and Bank-2 in good faith changed position in
reliance on the certification to their substantial detriment. Even if the
general rule that withdrawal of certification comes too late after an
innocent third person acquires rights in an instrument 24 4 is not
applicable, the certifying bank ought nevertheless to be estopped
from asserting its right to cancel the certification.
VII. RIGHTS ADJUSTMENT AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
If a funds redirection has' occurred, and the certifying bank in
fact pays the alternative payee, the bank may then charge the
drawer's account. Any certifying bank which pays such an instrument
would be engaging in less than prudent banking unless the redirec-
tion is accomplished without making the check appear irregular. The
question then becomes how the various rights of the parties may be
protected. In reality the question is how to protect AP and/or Bank-2
for, as has been shown earlier, the certifying bank has no interest
241. The Code provides that "[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity, including the law . . . relative to . . . estoppel . . . shall supple-
ment its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103.
242. See Jamestown Terminal Elevator Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976). In Hieb,
the court stated:
[T]he basic elements of an equitable estoppel, insofar as it relates to the person being
estopped, are: (1) conduct . . . which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts
are otherwise than those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the inten-
tion, or at least the expectation, that such conduct will be acted upon by, or will influ-
ence, the other party or persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real
facts. Insofar as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the elements are: (1) lack of
knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2)
reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct . . . of the party to be estopped; and (3) action
. . . based thereon, of such a character as to change the position or status of tile party
claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
Id. at 741, quoting Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D. 1976), quoting
Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1037, 1041-42 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
243. See U.C.C. § 3-411(1).
244. See text accompanying notes 236, 238 & 239 supra.
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other than its own nonliability,2 45 and the account of the drawer has
already been debited.
246
Obviously, the easiest and least costly alternative is a private
adjustment of rights, which can be accomplished formally. For exam-
ple, the certifying bank can insist that the drawer correct the asserted
impropriety and make a proper presentment or the certifying bank
can demand an indemnity or other agreement from the drawer. A
private adjustment can also be accomplished less formally by the cer-
tifying bank merely accepting the drawer's assurance that his intent
has been effectuated. Where the drawer is on the verge of insolvency
or the certifying bank desires to withdraw the certification and exer-
cise a right of set off, however, the bank may refuse not only to pay
the check, but also to privately adjust the rights of the parties. In that
situation, the rights of Bank-2 and AP to proceed both up to the
drawer and down to the certifying bank will become crucial. It is
clear that Bank-2 can require AP's indorsement and equally clear that
AP can require the drawer's, pursuant to section 3-201(3) of the
Code.2 47 Where the check has been redirected impliedly, however,
indorsement is not what is needed. Rather, the insertion of the
drawer's name as alternative payee or the addition of bearer words is
required. Although the Code is silent as to whether this modification
can be compelled, the better policy would be to read section 3-201(3)
to suggest that the "unqualified indorsement" language entails the
concept that the transferor engages that he will do what is necessary
to effectuate a proper transfer or negotiation. Without this expansive
reading, it will be necessary to invoke equity and the principles of
contract reformation to avoid an unjust result.
Where the redirection is made by means that make the instru-
ment look irregular or where the certifying bank attempts to with-
draw its certification, it may become necessary for AP and Bank-2 to
litigate to protect their rights. At that point, the question becomes
which parties they should name as defendants and what the underly-
ing theory of recovery should be.
The drawer may assert that because the certifying bank is
primarily liable on the instrument,2 48 an action against D would be
premature. D would contend either that the certified check has not
been dishonored or that he has been discharged by the certification.
245. See text accompanying notes 157 & 184-86 supra.
246. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
247. U.C.C. § 3-201(3).
248. Id. § 3-411.
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A careful reading of the Code, however, indicates that the drawer
and/or the certifying bank are proper parties to the action.
2 49
The initial provision of the Code governing the contract liability
of the drawer and acceptor of a check is section 3-413,250 which pro-
vides in part:
(1) The . . . acceptor engages that he will pay the instrument
according to its tenor at the time of his engagement or as com-
pleted pursuant to Section 3-115 on incomplete instruments.
(2) The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and
any necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount
of the draft to the holder or to any indorser who takes it up.
2 5
'
Since the bank has accepted the check by certifying it, 252 it is
apparent that the action against the certifying bank is proper, unless
"its tenor" in section 3-413 refers to more than merely amount. If it
does, by analogizing the check to an incomplete instrument, it could
be argued that the certifying bank engaged to pay the instrument to
D's designate.
Pursuant to section 3-507 of the Code,2 5 3 the liability of the
drawer is dependent upon the dishonor of the draft: "(1) An instru-
ment is dishonored when (a) a necessary or optional presentment is
duly made and due acceptance or payment is refused . . . ; or (b)
presentment is excused and the instrument is not duly accepted or
paid. . . (3) Return of an instrument for lack of proper indorsement
is not dishonor."
2 54
The drawer could assert that the instrument had not been dis-
honored when it was returned for lack of proper indorsement in cases
of implied funds redirection or for having been altered in cases of
other redirection, and that therefore action against him was prema-
ture. Dishonor, however, also occurs when presentment has been ex-
cused and the instrument has not been paid.2 5 Presentment is ex-
cused, according to section 3-511(2) of the Code,2 5 6 when "(a) the
party to be charged has waived it expressly or by implication either
before or after it is due; or (b) such party has himself dishonored the
instrument or has countermanded payment or otherwise has no rea-
249. See text accompanying notes 250-59 supra.
250. U.C.C. § 3-413.
251. Id. § 3-413(1), (2).
252. "Certification of check is acceptance." Id. § 3-411(1).
253. Id. § 3-507.
254. Id. § 3-507(1), (3).
255. Id. § 3-507(1)(b).
256. Id. § 3-511(2).
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son to expect or right to require that the instrument be accepted or
paid .... .257
Where the drawer has ordered a bank to pay an instrument, the
bank must be looked to first.2 58 If the drawer has acted in such a
manner that presentment will not be effective or has done something
so that the drawee certifying bank may not be liable, presentment is
excused.2 59 Here, where the drawer either indorsed the check or
attempted to change the recipient of the funds represented thereby,
he should not be able to prevent AP or Bank-2 from receiving reim-
bursement on the technicality that a dishonor has not occurred. The
drawer's actions show either that he waived presentment by implica-
tion or that he had no reason to expect that the check as currently
drawn would be paid. Both the drawer and the certifying bank are
therefore proper parties to an action.
The statutes also make clear that the drawer has not been dis-
charged. 260 The Code provides that a drawer is discharged when a
necessary presentment is delayed only if the drawee bank becomes
insolvent during the delay. 26' Since the certifying bank is not insol-
vent here, no discharge would occur. In addition, a drawer is dis-
charged by the act of certification only when the certification is
procured by the holder.2 62 The drawer, who procures certification
remains liable.2 6 3 Since the drawer has not been discharged from his
obligation to pay the instrument, and the instrument has not yet been
paid, he is a proper party to an action. Moreover, the drawer who,
through his representations and actions, created the dispute, should
not be able to claim that he is not a proper party to an action. The
certifying bank not having been prejudiced, it is still bound to its
contract and is also a proper party. Full and equitable relief can thus
be assured only if both parties are included in an action.
Once the parties and the legal theory for recovery have been
established, one must consider the arguments which can be raised by
the drawer and the certifying bank. Both will be prevented from pre-
vailing on most factual arguments by an estoppel. The bank will be
unable to withdraw its certification and the drawer will be unable to
assert the improper form of the check against AP or Bank-2. Both
parties may argue that technically no dishonor occurred, but, as has
257. id. § 3-511(2)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
258. See id. § 3-413. See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 92, § 13-9, at 411.
259. U.C.C. § 3-511.
260. See text accompanying notes 261-63 infra.
261. U.C.C. § 3-501(1)(c); id. § 3-502(1)(b).
262. id. § 3-411.
263. See id., Comment 1.
1978-1979]
42
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss1/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
been suggested, dishonor is not necessary to trigger the drawer's lia-
bility if he has no reason to expect payment.2 64 The certifying bank
may have waived its right to insist upon proper presentment to the
extent that its cancellation attempt after the first attempted by Bank-2
evidenced an intent to refuse to pay, even if the asserted impropriety
is cured. 265 Where the certifying bank has clearly indicated that it
will not honor its certification, neither AP nor Bank-2 need follow
through on the procedure of presentment for "[t]he purpose of pre-
sentment is to determine whether or not the maker, acceptor or
drawee will pay or accept; and when that question is clearly deter-
mined the holder is not required to go through a useless cere-
mony." 2 66 Whether or not there has been a technical dishonor is
therefore immaterial, and AP and Bank-2 would be entitled to prevail
against both the drawer and the certifying bank.
VIII. FUNDS REDIRECTION AS A PLANNING ToOL
The final area to be explored is the utility of funds redirection as
a planning device. Basically, it has no role whatsoever in preplan-
ning; it is solely a device for adjusting the rights of parties after an
attempt has been made to achieve a legitimate end in an unorthodox
fashion. This does not mean that funds redirection is either useless or
simply theoretical. Because problems like the hypothetical do arise,
some method of rights adjustment other than litigation is necessary,
although that clearly is an option.
The only prudent advice of counsel to a bank presented With a
redirected check would be to refuse payment. It is likely that the
attempted redirection by the addition of a payee will escape un-
noticed, unless it is less than neat. If the attempt is sloppy, therefore,
refusal to pay is in order, but only after checking with the redirec-
tor.2 67 Ordinarily, the redirection will be discovered by the first
bank to take the check, if at all. Although it may seem unreasonable
and costly to check with the customer, it will probably be less expen-
sive than refusal and subsequent litigation. Where the defect is the
fact that the check looks irregular, the first step should thus be to
contact the redirector.
Where the attempted redirection is only implied by indorse-
ment, the first step would be to check any signature card on file. If
264. See text accompanying notes 253-59 supra.
265. See U.C.C. § 3-511(2)(b).
266'. Id., Comment 7.
267. As posited, the redirector would be the drawer. In other cases the redirection might be
attempted by the payee or an indorsee.
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the drawer's indorsement matches closely the signature on file, the
next step would be to contact him. Obviously, the check should be
treated as a forged indorsement check if the signatures do not match.
Where the redirection has gone unnoticed, so that the check has
been paid, or where AP is still in possession of the check, it may
become necessary to ascertain whether the check should be treated as
bearer or order paper. If the check bears the genuine indorsement of
the drawer, his initials, or something similar next to an alteration, it
is probably preferable to treat the paper as bearer paper capable of
negotiation by delivery alone. 268 This has the advantage of con-
stituting subsequent takers as holders, thus allowing them to prevail
against the certifying bank if they can show they qualify as holders in
due course. 26 9 It has the disadvantage of surrendering the certainty
associated with a rule of no payment on irregular instruments. Al-
though the probability of recovery is left to chance, that can be
minimized to the extent that the taker at least inquired of the trans-
feror about the redirection. More importantly, the number of times
such a situation presents itself' warrants the continued use of the
bearer analogue. The alternative, to deny recovery by the good faith for
value transferee because of the refusal to adopt a bearer analysis, is
both unreasonable and unjust. This analysis requires the transferee to
perform the essentially useless act of seeking formal alteration of the
check. Moreover, it unjustly enriches either the certifying bank or
the drawer at the expense of a good faith, though admittedly negli-
gent, transferee.
It must be stressed that the use of the bearer analogue does not
facilitate AP's task of proving the genuineness of the signatures, good
faith, or value. It does deprive the certifying bank of the opportunity
to assert that the negligence of AP constituted notice of a claim or
defense, since AP should have realized that the improper indorse-
ment or seeming alteration suggested a defense or claim. Holder in
due course status may not be necessary, however, and the use of the
bearer analysis only addresses the redirection irregularity. Other pos-
sible irregularities may still preclude holder in due course status.
It should be clear that one ought to try to avoid the problem of
funds redirection. Since certified checks invariably deal with larger
sums than other checks, it may be necessary to resolve disputes sur-
rounding certified check redirection more often than those involving
redirection of other checks. Although the only planning for the trans-
action that can be done is to advise avoidance and care, once the
redirection attempt does occur it can be dealt with sensibly.
268. See U.C.C. § 3-202(1).
269. See notes 211-31 and accompanying text supra.
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The certified check remains viable despite the problems which
surround it and despite its treatment at the hands of courts like those
in Tonelli. In the area of funds redirection, where the certified check
is likely to appear more often than its noncertified counterpart, the
problems presented by certification are not so different from those
presented by other, less secure paper. To ascertain who prevails in a
funds redirection case, it is necessary to determine the intent of the
drawer. This intent is not the fictional intent arrived at by inspecting
the words of the drawer on his check. Rather, it is his expressed
intent which can be discovered by his actions and words at the time
of redirection and thereafter. Regardless of how the redirection is ef-
fected, or who the beneficiary is, or what type of accepted or unac-
cepted instrument is at issue, 270 both policy and justice will be satis-
fied if strict attention is paid to the redirector's intent.
Funds redirection can never be used from a planning point of
view, for advising clients to use less than fully accepted means of
transferring paper or to accept improperly indorsed paper would in-
vite dispute. It is equally obvious, however, that people often pursue
courses of action that are expedient but not advisable. When funds
redirection does occur, therefore, and counsel's advice becomes
necessary, redirection should be given effect as long as the client can
be fully protected.
270. See Farmer's Bank v. Humphrey, 36 Vt. 554 (1864). In Humphrey, the court held that
an instrument made payable to one payee but delivered to another with no indorsement what-
soever was enforceable by the payee, so long as he gave consideration for the transfer. Id. at
557.
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